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Restrictive  regulations  on the U.S. nonlife insurance  industry
have  affected  its efficiency  and  profitability,  especially  for such
mandatory  lines  as automobile  insurance.  Prudential  regulation
that emphasizes solvency monitoring  is preferable to price,
product, and  entry controls.
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The insurance  industry  is underdeveloped  in  also faced  many serious and  persistent  problems.
most developing  countries  because  of low levels  The problems  include the widespread  crisis in
of income  and wealth  and because  restrictive  liability  (including  product  liability  and medical
regulations  inhibit the supply  of insurance  malpractice),  the crisis in automobile  insurance,
services.  But several  counaries  have  begun to  the volatility  of investment  income,  the effects  of
reform  their insurance  industries.  market-driven  pricing  and underwriting  cycles,
and the difficulty  of measuring  insurance  sol-
To help those countries,  Grace and Barth  vency.
offer an overview  Lf  insurance  regulation  in the
United  States-and  discuss  the economics  and  The "long-tailed"  lines of insurance  - those
market structure  of nonlife insurance  in entry  that entail  long delays in final settlements  - are
and exit barTiers,  economies  of scale, and  exposed  to the vagaries  of inflation  and rising
conduct  and performance  studies.  costs.
They conclude  that the U.S. nonlife insur-  Two mandatory  lines  - third party automo-
ance industry  exhibits  low concentration  at both  bile insurance  and workers' compensation  (for
national  and state market levels.  Concentration  is  work  accidents)  - account for nearly 55 percent
low even on a line-by-line  basis.  of premiums.  These  two lines  - plus medical
malpractice,  other  liability, and aircraft  insurance
The primary  concern  of regulators  has been  - had combined  ratios  well over 125  percent  in
to protect policyholders  from insolvency,  but  1989.
regulation  has also often been  used to protect the
market position  of local insurance  companies  The industry  has some ability  to collude and
against  the entry  of out-of-state  competitors.  to set prices,  but seems to be competitive  and to
Regulation  has worked  best when  based on  eam profits below similarly  situated  fnancial
solvency  monitoring,  with limited  restrictions  on  firms. Insurance  profitability  is not consistently
entry.  It has been more  harmful  when it involved  above  or below nornal returns, although  earn-
controls  on premiums  and products and on the  ings for mandatory  and strictly regulated  lines of
industry', level of profitability.  automobile  insurance  and workers' compensa-
tion appear  to be below-adequate  for long-term
Over the years  the industry  has shown  a  viability.
remarkable  degree  of innovation,  although  it has
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The Regulation and Structure
of
Non-Life Insurance in the United States
Martin F. Grace & Michael M. BarthPREFACE
The state of development of the insurance industries in many developing countries reflects the low
level of income and especially  the low level of insurable wealth of their residents.  But the insurance
industries, for both life and nonlif, purposes, have also suffered in most developing countries from
restrictive regulations and domination by state-owned companies. Competition and innovation have
been stifled by controls on premiums and products; consumer protection has been inadequate; too
many risks have been retained in the domestic markets through restrictions on reinsurance with
international companies; and the financial position of most domestic companies has been weakened
by operating  inefriciencies, inadequate  premiums, exposure to  excessive risks,  and  compulsory
investments in low-yielding  assets, especially government securities.
Recent years have witnessed a recognition of the damaging effects of restrictive regulations and
several countries have undertaken, or have been willing to undertake, fundamental reforms of their
insurance sectors.  In the case of life insurance, these initiatives have often been linked with social
security and pension reforms.  In nonlife insurance, they have often emphasized the benefits from
opening domestic markets  to  foreign entry.  These benefits have taken  the form  not  only of
increased competition but also of transfer of financial technology, both in terms of new products
and in terms of better management and higher operating effciency.
One of the issues facing policymakers contemplating fundamental insurance reform Is what would
be the structure of a competitive  insurance industry and what kind of regulations would be required
to ensure  the financial soundness of insurance companies and  to  protect the Interests of policy
holders.  The present paper, commissioned from Messrs Martin Grace and Michael Barth, of the
Center for Risk Management and  Insurance Research of Georgia State University, provides an
overview of the regulation, structure,  and economic performance of the US nonlife insurance
industry.  The paper complements the research conducted by Mr Kenneth M. Wright on the US
life insurance  industry  (Wright,  1992).  The  US market  is,  of  course,  highly complex and
sophisticated and is faced with many problems that  would not  be relevant for  the majority of
developing countries.  However, it is hoped that  the analysis and  findings of the paper,  and
especially its emphasis on competition within a framework of sound prudential controls, would be
useful to policy makers and others dealing with insurance issues in developing countries.
Dimitri Vittas
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..I.  Introduction and Summary
A. Introduction
The  U.S.  non-life  insurance  industry  increased  government  regulation.  Current
suffered a liability crisis, a malpractice  crisis, a  government  concern arises from the size of the
worker's compensation  crisis, an auto insurance  industry  and its impact  on consumers. There are
crisis, and a solvency crisis during the 1980s  approximately  2,000  non-life  insurance
and  early  1990s.  As  a  result, the  non-life  companies  in the United States employing over
insurance  industry  is  under  more  rigorous  1 million people.  Non-life companies wrote
scrutiny  than at any time in its past. Academics,  over $205 billion in premiums and paid over $1
policy makers and  consumer advocates have  billion in state and federal taxes during 1988.
examined parts  of  the  industry  and  made  Non-life  premiums account for 2% of a typical
proposals for reform.  States have reacted by  consumer's budget and 4% of GNP.  Table 1.1
passing  new  laws  that  enhance  regulatory  provides additional  data on the size and growth
powers, reform tort laws, or set prices.  of the non-life insurance  industry.
The non-life insurance industry is generally
considered  competitive and,  under  current
economic  thinking, not a proper subject for
Table 1.1  Size and Growdh  of Non-Life  Industry  in Terms  of Assets and Surplus (OOO,OtX  omitted)
ADMI1TED  NET WRITTEN
ASSETS  CHANGE  SURPLUS  CHANGE  PREMIUMS CHANGE
1986  $393,188  NA  $110,019  NA  $165,289  NA
1987  $446,157  13.47%  $119,932  9.01%  $181,144  9.59%
1988  $497,969  11.61%  $136,081  13.47%  $189,520  4.62%
1989  $545,751  9.60%  $153,046  12.47%  $195,133  2.96%
Source: National Undeiwriter's  Profiles  - Property/LIability (1990).
Although there  are  approximately 2,000  95%  of  home-owners  carry  property
non-life  companies,  the  industry  is  not  insurance, most auto-owners  have some amount
monolithic.  Numerous market segments based  of coverage, and practically  all employers  carry
on lines of business (e.g.,  auto, home-owners,  workers  compensat;on  insurance  for  their
fire)  and  large  differences in  the  types  of  employees. Thus, even though most Americans
customers served (i.e., private or com-qercial)  have private insurance coverage for some of
exist. These differences  are not read,'  aDn rent  their  activities, it  is  provided by  numerous
to the typical consumer as he or she dei  ith  companies  each with different interests.
a  small  number of  companies for  non-life
insurance  purposes.
IPerenitage  of Total  Premiums
by lane  (1989)
78ER  (13 1%)
Auto  liahilty  (27.I?4)
HOMeounus  Mutiu-Pel  (8.5?  R
onmercia  Mult-Peril  (9.0%)/
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Flgure 1.1  Distrl'ution of Non-Ltfe  Premiwns
Figure 1.1 provides a description  of various  States  proposed  to spend approximately  $440
sectors of the property liability industry.  For  million  in  1991  to  regulate  the  insuranice
example,  auto insurance  (commercial  and private  industry  [NAIC  (1990)].  Since  non-life
passenger  liability  and  physical  damage)  premiums account for one-half of all insurance
accounts for the largest percentage  part of the  premiums,  states  should  spend  about  that
industry  (41%  of  premiums  written).  In  percentage  of their resources regulating  non-life
contrast,  glass coverage  accounts  for the smallest  companies.  In  most  cases,  however,  the
proportion (0.01%).  Tables 1.2 and 1.3 show  percentage is higher since non-life insurance
the  state  activity  of  the  non-life  insurance  regulators have  broader  autho:ity  than  life
industry.  A large number (45.8%) of the U.S.  regulators.  Life  insurance regulation covers
companies  are small  companies,  writing  business  solvency regulation while  non-life insurance
in only one state. The largest companies  tend to  regulation  concerns  both solvency  and price.
do  business in  most states.  However, they
represent a small percentage  of the total number
of companies  (15.2%) in the non-life insurance
industry.
2Table 1.2 Distributlon  of Licensed  Companies  Across  States
NO. OF
STATE  NO. OF  CUMULATIVE
LICENSES  COMPANME-  PERCENT  PERCENT
1  1,189  45.8%  4h.B%
2-5  407  15.7%  61.5%
6-10  179  6.9%  68.3%
11-24  241  9.3%  77.6%
25-39  186  7.2%  84.8%
40 +  395  15.2%  100.0%
TOTAL,  ',597  100.0%  100.0%
to  entry, have low concentration ratios, and
B.  Summary  relatively  low profits. The traditional  reason for
insurance  regulation  was  protection  from
This  paper describes the  history of  the  insolvencies. Today this is a small portion of
regulation  of  the  U.S.  non-life  insurance  regulation  in many states.  Given the problems
industry and  the  current  economics of  the  many states are experiencir.g,  there should be a
industry.  The U.S. non-life insurance industry  return to solvency  regulation.  Recently, Litan
isa very broad group of sub-industries  each with  (1992) called for  a  return to  the  traditional
its  own  particular  product  or  geographical  model  as  profit  regulation  and  solvency
market fragmented  by regulation  and economic  regulat.on conflict:  Restrictive regulation of
dictates.  Historical regulation  has led to many  profits leads  to an increase  in default  risk for the
inefficiencies.  For  example, states adopted  fim-
policies  through  their  taxation  system  that
encouraged  potentially  nonviable firms to enter  It slhould  be noted that even with the swing
a  market.  Other  regulations restricted the  back to more restrictive regulation, there have
companies' pricing ability, while other policies  been  numerous  benefits  from  increased
enforced collusion  among potential  competitors.  competition  in those lines that are subject to the
Not only has regulation caused inefficiencies,  most public scrutiny. Competition  has forced a
but it has often been applied inconsistentlv. The  reevaluation  of  inefficient  marketing  and
history  of  regulation  shows  swings  from  distribution  mechanisms  and  t has forced firms
solvency regulation  to profit regulation  back to  to adopt cost saving technologies.  There are
solvency  regulation.  enough benefits derived from  competition to
suggest  that  restrictive  price  regulation  is
One might argue that the insurance  industry  antithetical to  the  consumer's  interest.  In
does  not  fit  the traditional model of  public  addition, there is evidence  that strict regulation
utility/natural monopoly regulation.  This  is  increases the production inefficiencies of  the
because the sub-industries subject to the most  typical  insurance  firm. Very few state insurance
public scrutiny and regulation  have no barriers  statutes, however, are written from this
3Table 1.3  Distribution  of Premlwns among Companies  and States
NO. OF
STATES  NO. OF  CUMULATIVE
ACTiVE  COMPANIES  PERCENT  PERCENT
1  959  42.5%  42.5%
2-5  415  18.4%  60.9%
6-10  174  7.7%  68.6%
11-24  223  9.9%  78.5%
25-39  140  6.2%  84.7%
40 +  346  15.3%  100.0%
NO. OF  MILLIONS  OF
STATES  NO. OF  DOLLARS  OF  PERCENT
ACTIVE  COMPANIES  rREMIUM  OF TOTAL
1  959  $24,060  10.8%
2-5  415  $13,452  6.1%
6-10  174  $8,105  3.6%
11-24  223  14,163  6.3%
25-39  140  11,570  5.1%
40 +  336  $154,634  68.4%
TOTAL  2,257  $221,084  100.0%
Source: National Association  of Insurance  Commissioners,  Annual Statement  Compilation
Tapes 1989.
perspective.  Thus, for the immediate future,  becomes more severe, there should be supply
there  is  little  hope  for  improvement in  the  restrictions as  firms quit markets.  This has
regulatory environment.  already  occurred  in  Massachusetts  and
California, which are two relatively large states
The  existing problems are  potentially a  in terms of population.
result of historic social and regulatory policies
specific to the industry or a result of exogenous  Two  external factors affect the  industry.
influences.  The industry specific policies are  First,  insurance rate  setting  has  become  a
aimed  at  the  state's  control of  the  market.  political  decision  in  many  states  due  to
However, the state really is no longer  in control  seemingly large price increases during the last
of  a  multi-state and  multi-product company.  twenty years.  The political decision  to set rates
Even if in the past, the state conld control a  is a  popular decision, but if the high market
large foreign multi-state company, this is  no  rates are not  the  result of  abuse of  market
longer true today.  In addition, as regulation  power, then regulation serves no purpose and
4I  I  I  I  L 
may  be damaging  to the health  of the industry.  This may  require  a federal  regulatory  authority
High prices resulting  from competition  infer  and less local political  control  over prices and
scarcity  and a regulatory  reduction  of prices  regulatory  policies. Howe,  er, this is not  likely
does  not soive  the scarcity  problem.  soon  as the states  view  a federal  preemption  of
insuran^e  r-gulation  as a loss of sovereignty.
The  second  exogenous  influence  is  the  effect  Policy,.  akers  and Congress  are beginning  to s 3e
of the change  in the legal  environment  over  the  a necessity  for a different  regulatory  scenario,
last two  or three  decades. This  change  in legal  but it will take a major overhaul  t.f existing
liability has  led  to  allegations of  insurer  tederal  and state  legislation.  However,  without
collusion  to reduce  coverage  for certain  types  of  such a change  the long-run  viability  of certain
policies  to limit  insurer  liability.  This change  in  portions  of the non-life  insurance  industry  are at
tse liability  regime  may  not affect  the structure  stakc.
of the market, but may reduce the market's
incentives  to provide  insurance. The liability  This paper provides an overview  of the
crisis  is exogenous  to thc insurance  industry,  but  economics  and regulation  of the U.S. non-life
the industry  is regulated  more  strictly  as a result.  insurance  industry.  Chapter 2 describes  the
It is easier  to regulate  in the short  run than  solve  evoluti3n  of regulation  and  contains  a discussion
the real problems.  of modern regulatory  issues confronting  the
industry. Chapter  3 describes  and analyzes  the
The  U.S. system  has allowed  a very strong  current  non-life  insurance  market  focusing  on
industry to  evolve over the last 200 years.  the traditional  industrial  organization  economic
However,  political  control  of prices  has tended  concerns  of conduct,  structure  and  performance.
to  overshadow the  traditional regulatory  Although  regulatory  institutions  affect market
approach  of  protecting  society  against  development  and  vice  versa,  the  chapters  are  self
insolvency.  This  has created  more  problems  and  contained and  can  be  read  independently.
has  encouraged even  further  regulation.  Together, they complement  each other and
Structural  changes  in regulation  are necessary.  provide  a  comprehensive  picture  of  the
economics  and  regulation  of the U.S. market.
5II. A Brief History and Overview  of the Regulation of the U.S.
Non-Life  Insurance Industry
A. History  of Regulation
Early restrictions  placed in the corporate
There are a number  of potential  rationales  charter  related  to  investment reslrictions
for regulation  of the insurance  industry  and it is  [Kimball  (1960)].  For example, there were
not  surprising  that  these  reasons  were  recognized  restrictions  cii the ownership  of real  estate  as it
at an early date. Issues  of solvency,  consumer  was thought to be too illiquid  to  allow for
protection, and corporate power abuse, for  proper  or useful  reserving. Solvency  concerns
example, existed at  the  beginning of  the  were not  the  entire reason for  investment
development  of  the U.S.  non-life insurance  restrictions,  however. Orren (1974)  accounts
industry. Since  little  insurance  was  available  in  for  a  number of  different stages of  state
Colonial  and post-Colonial  America,  the need  legislative  restrictions,  the  f;i,t  stage
for regulation  was non-existent. As soon as  commencing  with  the  development  of  the
domestic  firms  came  into  existence,  the need  for  industry  in the late Eighteenth  Century. The
some  form  of regulation  became  apparent.  With  concern at  this  time  was  that  insurance
the formation  of two Pennsylvanian  insurance  companies  might be used as a vehicle  for the
companies  in  the  laWe  1700s, the  state of  concentration  of wealth  and power. The early
Pennsylvania coimmen_ed regulating  the  colonial  experience with  British  Crown
industry.  corporations  was very unsatisfactory  and thus
the early restrictions  were to keep  the size and
Corporations  were not  very common  during  power  of the corporations  in check. A second
the late  Eighteenth  century  and  early  Nineteenth  concern  was the outflow  of capital  to out-of-
century  and they were a creature  of the state  state, and predominantly  eastern, companies.
legislature and thus could be  regulated  by  States  imposed  requirements  that an out-of-state
placing  limitations  in the companies'  corporate  company  invest assets in the host state as a
charters.  The  modern  administrative  condition  of doing  business.  Some  of these
commission  did not  yet exist  when  insurers  first  restrictions  remained  until  modern  times.'
began  doing  business. Thus, alternate  means  of
restricting  the activities  of firms  in the industry  Other  early  regulation was  based on
were necessary.  According  to Patterson  (1927)  taxation. Massachusetts  enacted  its first tax in
the growth  of the use of the corporate  form  was  1785  that  was,  ironically,  a stamp  tax [Kimball:
the impetus  behind  the demand  for increased  (1960):  2511,  while  New  York  put in place  the
insurance regulation as  the  corporate form  first premium  tax in 1824 [Patterson  (1927):
permitted  larger-scale  insurance  operations.  In  524], and Illinois  taxed out-of-state  companies
addition,  it was possible  to accumulate  large  total premiums  in  1844 [Grace and Skipper
amounts  of capital  from small  investors  and  the  (1990)]. As can be seen by the Illinois  tax,
corporate  form  permitted  an indefinite  existence  taxation  was also used as a way of putting  up
allowing wealth accumulation  over  a  long  barriers  to entry  to keep out foreign  insurers.
period.  Some  states  that attempted  to develop  their own
industry  while  erecting  tax barriers  to entry of
foreign  insurers  saw this policy  backfire. For
6example,  New York's premium tax was 10% for  most state insurance  regulation  would be voided
alien Insurers  (and zero for New  York domiciled  as most sales were of an interstate nature. The
companies), but  after  a  major fire  in  1835  Supreme Court held in Paul v.  Virginia that
bankrupted  23 of 26 fire companies, New York  Congress  did  have  power  over  interstate
lowered  the rate to 2% in order to attract foreign  commerce  and that the commerce  clause would
insurers [Lilly (1976)]. D ;ring the early years  preclude regulation  of interstate  business, but it
of insurance regulation  in the U.S. most of the  also held that insurance  was not commerce  under
regulation  was very haphazard and tended to be  the commerce clause because it was local in
relatively  simple  as  the  corporate  charter  nature.  The insurance contract was a  "local"
restrictions could not be as broad as might be  contract  because  the contract  was executed  in the
made by the modern administrative  review and  same state that the insured resided.  This case
r-  Atory process.  put the control of the insurance industry firnly
into the hands of the states.
B.  State Regulation  and Paul v.
Virginia  C.  Early Insolvency  Regulation
From the founding of the nation, the states  Another major dimension  to early insurance
regulated the business  of insurance. There was  regulation  was insolvency  protection  regulation.
no real thought concerning a federal role in the  The idea is that disclosure of certain company
regulatory process for  almost seventy years.  information would  provide  consumers with
However, in  1865 the first suggestions for a  information  that could be used to judge whether
federal role  were made  when the insurance  the company was sound.  Patterson states that
industry  lobbied  Congress  for  a  National  Massachusetts first  required  this  type  of
Incorporatio  l Act that would allow for fede.ally  information  to be made public in 1799  and New
franchised  insurance  corporations  and immunity  York did so in 1828 [Patterson  (1927)  525-526].
from state regulation.  Banks had previously
obtained a  federal incorporation act,  but the  Even with disclosure regulation, however,
insurance  industry  act did not pass. Thus, states  insolvencies  still occurred.  Most states  did not
were left in control of the insurance industry  really attempt to  regulate and those that did,
[Day (1970)].  tended to  have very  weak  regulations. The
typical insolvency scenario involved the fire
A second attempt  to obtain  federal oversight  line.  Numerous fire companies existed in the
of the insurance industry was made through the  market.  Some offered iow prices (with little or
judicial system.  The State of Virginia required  no reserving),  while  others offered  higher  prices
that  all  agents  of  out-of-state  insurance  for similar coverage (with adequate reserving).
companies register and  that  the  out-of-state  Consumers  purchased  the inexpensive  insurance.
companies  register.  The agent of a New York  If  a  conflagration occurred,  the  insured's
company  was prosecuted  for violating  the state's  company (and many others) went bankrupt as
registration requirements.  This case, Paul v.  entite sections of cities were destroyed.  The
Virginia, 2 set the tone for federal-state  insurance  insured was left without coverage.  After the
relations to the present day.  The issue of the  bankruptcies,  new firms entered the market and
case  was  whether  states  could  regulate  again offered inexpensive  insurance.  One can
businesses  involved  in interstate  commerce  since  argue that the consumer was buying insurance
the U.S. Constitution  grants this power solely to  for damage caused if  only his  property was
Congress. 3 If  the  Constitution's commerce  destroyed  by fire.  The insurance  consumer  was
power granted to Congress  prohibited  the states  not purchasing insurance for the case in which
from regulating interstate insurance sales, then  an entire section of  the town was destroyed.
7However, calls to stop this boom-and-bust  were  D.  Twentieth  Century  Regulation
common.
The  late  Nineteenth  Century  and  the
Other structural problems  related to failures  beginning  of the Twentieth  Century saw the rise
existed  in the fire line.  Agents  who did not bear  of the populist movement in the United States.
any risk provided clients to companies without  This movement was responsible for the  first
proper screening. Thus, improper reserving in  great wave of regulation in the United States.
cases  of  major  catastrophes  and  poor  Congress  set  up  the  Interstate  Commerce
underwriting  caused  a major bankruptcy  problem  Commission,  the Food  and Drug Administration,
[Stewart, Stewart, and Roodis (1991)].  the Federal Trade Commission,  and states  set up
administrative  commission  to  regulate
This  bankruptcy problem  provoked two  telephones,  electricity,  water, and other utilities.
responses: one by the industry  and the other by  In addition, the Congress passed the Sherman
the  states.  The industry's effort focused on  Antitrust  Act  that  prohibited  contracts,
colluding  to set rates and to restrict competition  combinations,  or  conspiracies in restraints of
between companies and agents.  The National  trade.  Many states also passed anti-collusion
Board of Fire Underwriters was formed to set  (or  anti-compact) laws  prohibiting insurance
rates and agent commissions  in 1866.  Because  companies from entering into compacts to  set
he  National Board had  no  real enforcement  terms or  restrict competition. With increased
p7owers  nor  did  the  organization  have the  government  supervision  came increased  press
economic  ability  to punish  violators  for deviating  scrutiny.  This scrutiny had  an effect on the
from the set rates, many companies  did so.  So,  insurance business in general even  ou  the
after two major fires in Chicago and Boston in  primary focus  was  on the life insurance  industry.
1871  and  1872 respectively, 3,000  of  the
country's 4,000 fire insurance companies went
bankrupt, allegedly due to improper reserving  Many  of the largest  life insurance  companies
and inadequate  pricing. Other regional  and state  were mutual companies, companies  owned not
boards were set up to set rates and these boards  by shareholders but by policyh'Aders. Because
developed into regional rating bureaus by the  of certail' practices  that are described  more fully
1880s.  These  boards,  too,  were  fairly  in  Meier  (1987),  mutual  companies  were
ineffective because there were no barriers to  immune from oversight by the policy holders.
entry and there was no ability to detect, much  Thus, there were great excesses in salaries paid
less, punish cheaters [Joskow  (1973)].  to  management and great amounts of  money
spent on perquisites. In fact, the public became
The  states'  response  was  to  impose  aware of these abuses only  when the Chairman
regulation in  a  more systematic way.  State  of  The  Equitable Insurance Company died,
insurance commissions were  created, policy  leaving control of the company  to his son.  The
forms were standardized  so that consumers  could  son was not popular with the other company
compare policy contracts, reserve requirements  directors and they made his abuses public.  As
were imposed, and restrictions on the types of  a  result,  in  1906 the  State  of  New  York
assets  that  were  allowed to  be  used  for  commenced  an investigation  of the practices of
investment purposes were  implemented [Day  insurance companies known as the Armstrong
(1970].  Committee  investigation. In the aftermath  of the
Armstrong  investigation,  New York enacted  the
first  comprehensive stace insurance code  to
reduce the likelihood of  management abuses
[Meier (1987)].
8A second major investigation  known as the  companies  to invest up to 2% of funds in non-
Merrit Committee  investigation  resulted  from the  approved  assets.
large  number  of  insurer  bankruptcies  and
subsequent insurance price increases after the  E.  Southeastern Underwriters  and
1906  San  Francisco  earthquake.  The companies  the McCarran-Ferguson  Act
blamed the resulting  failures  on excessive  or
destructive  competition [Hanson,  Dinneen, and
Johnson, (1974)].  The Committee concluded  In  1944, the U.S.  Department of Justice
that anti-compact laws had hurt  the industry  brought suit against one of  the regional rate
because no one company had enough data to  setting  bureaus,  Southeastern  Underwriters
make accurate  loss forecasts. Only by colluding  Association, for  engaging in  practices that
on information sharing and rate setting could  allegedly violated the Sherman Antitrust Acte.
companies  compete  "fairly."  New York passed  It  is  interesting to  note  that  the  suit  was
a law in  1911 allowing mandated bureau rates  originally started by the Attorney General for
to prevent the so-called destructive  competition.  the State of Missouri. In 1922  Missouri  felt that
These  bureau rates would, in many  states, be the  certain fire insurance rates were too high and
only rates allowed  to be charged  by the industry.  attempted  to rescind  the regional rating  bureau's
This time the enforcement  worked because the  rates  in  Missouri.  However,  the  industry
bureau had  the police power of the state to  brought over 100 lawsuits seeking  to enjoin the
enforce the rates.  One should note that the  state from rescinding the rates.  Over the next
regulators were concerned, not with monopoly  fifteen  years the state and the industry  negotiated
pricing,  but  with  insolvencies VJoskow  and  and came up with a plan finalized in the late
McLaughlin  (1991)].  1930s. However, the settlement involved pay-
offs to government  officials. After discovering
Insurers were  also  subject to  organized  the bribes, the Missouri attorney general filed
regulation of investment  decisions for the first  suit against all the companies that contributed
time.  This is what Orren (1974) terms the  money to the bribe fund.  Since the attempt to
second  stage  of investment  restriction/regulation.  restrict prices  actually occurred across  state
As  a  result  of  the  concerns raised  by  the  lines, Missouri  asked the Department  of Justice
Armstrong  Committee  the  industry  was  for assistance  [Meier (1987)].
restricted  to  owning  very  conservative
investments,  such as bonds. States attempted  to  The Department  investigated  and filed a suit
encourage insurers to invest in state securities,  alleging that  Southeastern Underwriters was
prohibited  them from investing  in the equities of  price fixing and engaging in other conduct that
other corporations, and prohibited them from  violated antitrust laws.  Because of  Paul  v.
investing  in other high risk securities. Common  Virginia  and  at  least eight other  cases,  the
belief suggests  that the restriction  on the ability  industry relied upon the fact that insurance was
to  invest  in  the  common  stock  of  other  not subject to the federal commerce power or
corporations reduced the impact of the Great  legislation  based upon the federal commerce
Depression on the  insurance industry.  One  power, e.g., the Sherman  Act [Day (1970)1.
could argue that it also prevented insurers from
obtaining security and  profits  in  the  market  The  Supreme  Court  in  Southeastern
during  the  time  preceding  the  depression.  Underwriters  v.  U.S held that  insurance was
However, after the start of the Depression, the  subject to  the commerce power as  insurance
states allowed  more types of assets to be owned.  could  constitute  interstate  coSmerce.  In
Other government securities were added, like  addition, the Court held that the Sherman Act
Federal Home Administration  bonds, common  could  be  applied  to  the  Southeastern
stock,  and  certain  states  even  permitted  Underwriters  (and other rating bureaus)  and then
9found  Southeastern Underwriters  guilty  of  they pleased [NAIC Model Laws (1990) and
violating the  law.  By  overturning Paul v.  Day (1970)].
Virginia, the Supreme Court voided most state
regulation  of insurance  and threw the regulators  During the 1960s and  1970s many states
and the industry into chaos.  changed  their statutes to make their rating laws
more in line with the competitive  market.  For
This  chaos was relatively short lived as  example, states allowed companies  to use rates
Congress  was intensively  lobbied  to overturn  the  prior  to  filing  with the  commissioner.  The
Court's  decision.  The  resulting legislation,  commissioner  could presumably  reject the rates
known  as  the  McCarran-Ferguson  Act, 5 if they were  inadequate, but this  was not a
returned to the states the power to regulate and  frequent occurrence.  In adi  iition, some states
tax the  insurance industry free  from  federal  removed, almost completely, the rate-setting  or
control and regulation.  The major exemptions  approval  powers  of the insurance  commissioner.
were that the antitrust laws would still apply to  These changes increased after a  study by the
an  insurer  who  engages in  anti-competitive  New York Insurance Department found that
practices  outside  the "business  of insurance". In  rates in so-called competitive  states were lower
addition, there was no exemption  for boycotts  or  than in states where rates were determined  in a
intimidation.  This exemption  was designed  to  non-competitive  manner  [See  Harrington  (1984a)
allow the  insurers to  share  information and  and (1984b)].  Thus, state regulation  entered a
engage in other practices that may violate the  weakly pro-competitive era that  lasted, with
Sherman Act,  but  to  prevent  insurers from  notable exceptions,  until the mid to late 1980s.
colluding  to  keep  competitors out  of  the
business. However, as Joskow and McLaughlin  G.  Overview of Current  Issues
(1991) point out, it seems pointless to prohibit
this  type  of  behavior when the  industry is  The  current  industry  issues  are  not
allowed to accomplish  the same thing through  necessarily new, and often appear periodically
other anti-competitive  practices.  over the years  in  response to  some stimuli.
However,  the  responses  of  the  regulatory
community  to these issues often change from F.  Removal of Bureau Rates and  period to  period,  and  some  of  the  most
the Move to Competition  important  pieces of insurance  legislation,  such as
the introduction  of insurance  guaranty funds or
The NAIC  proposed  model legislation  to the  the introduction  of automobile  personal injury
states and by  1951 it was adopted in almost  protection  coverage, are direct responses  to these
original  form  in  all  states.  Some  of  the  stimuli. While the future regulatory response  to
provisions of this model law allowed states to  these particular issues is unknown at this time,
regulate and license regional rating bureaus, to  these are areas  requiring attention in the near
set rates, to regulate  policy forms, and to license  term.
agents.  One  major deviation from  the law
regarded how rates were actually set.  Three  The  Liability  Crisis.  The  crisis  in  liability
approaches  were adopted: (1) bureaus set rates  insurance is not actually a current crisis but a
that were then applied  uniformly  for all insurers  seemingly  continuingcrisis,  periodically  erupting
within a state; (2)  the state allowed  the insurer  in one or more of the liability  lines of insurance.
to propose  rates with the commissioner  who  then  For instance, the Medical Malpractice line of
could reject them  if  they  were  held to  be  insurance  has experienced  two crises in the last
unreasonable;  and (3) insurers could  set any rate  twenty years, generally tied to the upswings of
the insurance cycle for that line.  The general
10liability line experienced  a crisis in recent years  of  the  loss.  Property-liability insurance is
as the cycle turned and prices increased while  indemnity  insurance,  which is designed  to make
availability  declined. The current crisis gaining  a person whole again following a loss.  The
the most attention is the crisis in the workers  removal of the insurance does not remove the
compensation  line, a highly politicized issue in  loss that occurred, it only shifts  the obligation  to
the various states.  Indeed, budgetary impasses  pay for the loss from the insurer back to the
in  Connecticut, Maine and  California were  policyholder.  The underlying problems that
partially the result of proposals to reform those  have caused the explosive growth in insurance
states'  workers  compensation systems,  and  costs have not  been  addressed except on  a
workers compensation  problems  abound  in other  superficial  basis in most states.
states as well.  Crisis is a much over-worked
term  in  the  insurance industry, and  various  Some of these underlying  costs relate  to
crises  in  insurance  availability  and/or  lawyers,  litigation,  and  the  tort  system.
affordability  have been around for a number  of  According to  the  Bush Administration, the
years, and should continue into the foreseeable  United States currently has 70% of the world's
future. 6 lawyers.  A recent study by Tillinghast (1989)
estimated that the United States spends about
General liability insurance has become  2.5%  of  its  Gross National Product on  tort
much more volatile in recent years.  The long  costs,  substantially  more  than  other
"tail"  on  the  coverage  leaves an  insurance  industrialized  nations.  Additionally, a  recent
company  liable for losses long after the last of  closed claims  study  of  automobile personal
the premium is earned and the books are closed,  injury claims conducted by  the All  Industry
Often,  judicial interpretation  of contracts  renders  Research Advisory Council [AIRAC (1988)]
insurance coverage where none was originally  reveals that there has been a significant  increase
intended  by  the  insurance  company.  in the frequency  and severity  of claims involving
Additionally,  unexpected  loss  occurrences  appear  simple sprains and strains, especially when a
that were not contemplated  when the contract  lawyer is involved  in the claims  process.  All of
was designed, such  as  the  asbestos hazard,  these  factors  point  towards  increases  in
liability for the side effects of patent drugs, or  insurance  costs in the future.
intentional  toxic waste dumping.  The trends in the future costs are only a
A partial solution  to the problem on the  small factor in the availability  crises. As long as
insurance industry's part was the introduction  of  the  loss costs are  relatively predictable, the
the  claims-made policy in  1986, which was  insurance industry is able to establish a price.
intended to  place a  limit on the time during  When the loss costs become unpredictable or
which  an  obligation  could  be  presented.'  less predictable, insurers are likely to avoid that
Therefore, the insurance company would not  business or raise prices to account for greater
have to worry over having unexpected claims  uncertainty,  thus, the availability  or affordability
arise years and even decades  after the expiration  of that insurance coverage is reduced.  When
of the policy.  The full impact of the claims-  uncertainty  regarding  the  expected  losses
made policy will not be known  for years, but it  increases insurers will require higher relative
may be expected to lessen some, but certainly  prices in order to provide the coverage or else
not all, of the variability and thus enhance the  they will simply cease to provide the coverage
predictability  of liability losses.  and shift capital and other resources into more
predictable  ventures  more closely  matching  their
However,  the  removal  of  insurance  risk/return temperament.
coverage  does not accomplish  the extinguishment
11A further source of instability  is the rate  the largest  single line of insurance,  and therefore
approval process at the state level.  While in  the  final resolution of  this  issue is  of  great
principle insurers pass along all loss costs and  importance  to the industry as well as the public
administrative costs  to  their  customers,  in  at large. The growing  uncertainty  in this line of
practice  the state regulators  often restrict pricing  insurance has  caused some  large  insurance
decisions. These  restrictions  are often  politically  companies to  pull  out  of  the  personal lines
motivated  and fail to address  the practical issues  markets and  to  concentrate on  other,  more
involved.  For instance, current trends in the  lucrative lines.  One result of the pullout of
workers compensation  line are to restrict rate  underpriced companies is to raise the overall
increases, even when justified.  The medical  average  premiums.  Automobile  liability
portion of the workers compensation  claims is  insurance  premiums  cover a very wide range for
rising  at  a  much  higher rate  than  general  identical policyholders, and when underpriced
inflation,  and has been for the last twenty  years.  companies  withdraw  from a market  or otherwise
Increasing health  care  costs  are  a  current  restrict themselves,  their customers  are forced to
concern with state and federal regulators, but  seek insurance from other, often higher-priced
efforts  to  curb  increases  have  not  proven  competitor  insurance  companies. The end result
effective.  These medical loss costs that are  is often  that the average  premiums  rise following
driving up  the  cost of  health  care  are also  regulatory  actions of this nature, and in the first
affecting the  workers  compensation line  of  year following  the implementation  of Proposition
insurance  as well as the automobile  liability  line,  103  in California  this is indeed what occurred as
which together account for over forty percent of  the average premiums in that state actually  rose
the property-liability  insurance  industry's  written  in the period following  implementation.
premiums.
Banks  in  Insurance.  Currently,  federally
Automobile  Insurance  Crisis. Regulators  across  chartered  banks  are  prohibited  from
the country have come under criticism  in recent  underwriting  insurance  products  and  are
years  for  allowing  automobile  insurance  generally prohibited from  acting as  insurance
companies to  reap exorbitant profits and for  agents  by  the  states.  However,  these
allowing premiums to  spiral upwards out  of  prohibitions are  gradually  changing.  For
control.  In  California,  a  voter  initiative,  instance,  California's  Proposition  103  opened  the
Proposition 103,'  passed in  1989 mandating  door for banks to act as insurance  agents and to
automobile  insuranwce rate  rollbacks  and  sell  insurance  products.  Delaware  passed
imposing  severe restrictions  on the operations  of  legislation  allowing  state chartered  institutions  to
automobile  insurers. In the wake of the passage  underwrite as well as sell insurance products.
of Proposition 103, over forty states attempted  Federal banking legislation proposed by  the
to enact similar legislation,  although  to varying  Bush  Administration  in 1991 called for removal
degrees  of success. In some states,  the measures  of  the historical barriers forbidding banks to
were rejected in the legislature and in others  underwrite insurance. 1"  Additionally, many
they were overturned  by the courts.  states have relaxed their regulatory prohibitions
as  well,  and  a  combination of  banking and
The  status of  the  rate rollbacks and  insurance should  become a reality in time.
premium rebates mandated under California's
controversial law are unclear.  The across the  In  Europe, banking and insurance are
board  rollbacks  have  been  held  to  be  already  partners. Arguably,  there are economies
unconstitutional so far,  although California's  of  both  scale  and  scope to  be  realized by
newly  elected  insurance  commissioner has  combining  all financial  services into one entity.
renewed  efforts  to  see  that  they  are  Of course, there are dangers as well, and most
implemented. 9 Automobile  liability insurance  is  proposals  for  incorporating  insurance
12underwriting into banking  entail the erection of  Group,  USAA  Group,  and  The  Prudential
"fire walls" to completely  separate the activities  Insurance Company of  America  all  include
of the bank from the activities  of the insurer.  banking  organizations  in their overall corporate
holdings [Toivonen  (1990)].
With  regard  to  banking  institutions
performing the services of an insurance agent  Federal  Solvency  Regulation.  Recently,
(versus  actually underwriting  the business),  this  proposals  for  a  federal  role  in  insurance
represents  a  natural  extension  of  current  company  solvency  regulation  have emerged  from
services. Competition  has narrowed interest  rate  a twenty year dormancy, following a spate of
spreads  for banking  organizations,  and more and  large-scale  insurance  company  insolvencies
more banks are beginning to  rely on fee-for-  during the 1980s.  Additionally,  worries about
service income to  supplement their traditional  the potential  of the insurance  industry  becoming
sources of revenue.  The bank's customer  base  the  "S  &  L  Crisis" of  the  1990s, with  its
represents  a  natural  market  for  insurance  concomitant  federal  bailout,  have  stirred
products that may generate commission  income  renewed interest in  some  form  of  national
for  the bank  for  relatively little  incremental  insolvency guaranty mechanism.  The federal
effort, while at the same time offering insurers  government relinquished the role of insurance
a marketing  opportunity.  regulation  to the various states with the passage
of the McCarran-Ferguson  Act in 1945.  Since
Currently,  integration of  banking and  that time, there have been periodic calls for the
insurance  is opposed  by many  regulators  as well  federal  government  to reassume  responsibility  in
as by insurance agents, who would face stiff  this area.  The implementation  of the states'
competition  from a non-traditional  source.  The  property-liability  insurance  guaranty  funds  in the
original prohibitions against banks engaging in  early  1970s  was  a  direct  response  -to
non-banking  activities  were implemented  during  Congressional  proposals to  establish a federal
the Great Depression  of the 1930s,  when it was  regulatory  authority  to  administer  insurer
believed that these activities had contributed  to  solvency measures.  In  the last three  years,
the banking  system collapse. Those beliefs  have  Congress has again turned its attention to the
been largely discounted, and bank deregulation  insurance  industry  and especially  to the adequacy
during the last decade has moved at a brisk  of continued  state-by-state  regulation.
pace.
A major concern  with the implementation
On the other hand, prohibitions against  of federal regulation  of insurance  solvency  is the
insurers  engaging  in  non-insurance  (i.e.,  problem of a dual set of regulatory authorities,
"banking")  activities  are generally  codified  at the  both  at  the  federal  and  at  the  state  level.
state level.  In Florida, for instance, the law  Additionally,  it  has  been  suggested  that
reads "No domestic  insurer shall engage  directly  regulation  at the federal level would be no more
or  indirectly in  any  business other than the  effective  than that currently in place at the state
insurance  business  and  business  activities  level.
reasonably and necessarily incidental to  such
insurance business.""  Additionally, most  In an effort to implement some measure
states  limit  the  investments allowed in  the  of uniformity in the regulatory system by state,
common stock  of  non-insurance companies,  the NAIC has implemented  a new accreditation
effectively  blocking off conglomeration. These  program  for  each  state's  insurance
restrictions notwithstanding,  there are numerous  commissioner's office  [NAIC  (1991)].  As
instances  of  insurance  companies  owning  originally proposed, this program would have
banking  institutions:  John  Hancock  Mutual  Life,  severely  limited  the ability  of insurers domiciled
The Travelers Corporation, Hartford Insurance  in a non-accredited  state to do business in other
13states. Recent modifications  to the accreditation  insurance. However, in many cases the various
program have lessened  some of the impact, but  states allow a  premium tax offset, which in
it is a  concrete step towards fostering formal  effect passes the cost of insurer insolvencies  to
cooperation among state regulators in  lieu of  the citizens in that state. 14 Annual assessments
federal regulation.  are based on prior year written premiums and
are not adjusted  for risk.
Current State Insolvency Guaranty System.
Currently, each  of  the  states and territories  Insurer insolvencies  are cyclical  in nature,
administers  its  own  guaranty  mechanism,  and  have  been  circumstantially linked  with
technically  independent of  the  other  state  insurance  cycles  [Gottheimer  (1989)1.
jurisdictions  although  there  is  cooperation  Rappaport  (1989) attributes  the large number of
through the Nt%IC  and the National Conference  insolvencies  in  1975  to  the  recessionary
of Insurance Guaranty Funds (NCIGF).  This  pressures and stagfla!ion  of the early 1970s. He
tatter organization  is made up of and funded by  also  identified declining interest rates  and  a
47  post-assessment guaranty  funds,  and  its  strong dollar as contributing  factors for the high
purpose is to assist the individual  guaranty  funds  number of insolvenciet m  1985.  Obviously,
in fulfilling  their statutory  obligations  as well as  both internal industry economic  factors as well
to  facilitate  interfund  cooperation  and  as  external national economic factors have a
communication  [NCIGF (1990)].  strong  impact on  the  solvency of  insurers.
Insurance  companies  are increasingly  susceptible
History  and  Trends  in  Insolvenca  to the macroeconomic  environment  because of
Guaranty  Funds.  Most state insurance  guaranty  increasing  reliance  on  investment  income,
funds were  created during the  early  1970s,  coupled  with deteriorating  underwriting  returns.
mainly in response to federal moves to enact a
federal  insolvency  system.  12  These  state  In  1989,  there  were  a  record  43
guaranty funds were as a rule modeled  after the  involuntary  corporate  retirements,  twice  as many
NAIC  Model  Bill,  which  called  for  a  as in  1988.15  These involuntary retirements
post-assessment  guaranty  system for all licensed  were concentrated in  only a  few domiciliary
property-casualty insurance companies doing  states,  and  included  some  rather  large
business  within  a state. Another response  to the  companies. The NCIGF  reported assessments  of
insolvency problem  at  that  time  was  the  $246,317,885 on fourteen insolvent companies
expansion of  uninsured motorist coverage in  during 1989.  Additionally, insolvencies from
many  states  to include  policyholders  of insolvent  prior  years and  from non-specified company
companies  within  the  definition  of  an  insolvencies required  over  $570,000,000  in
"uninsured  motorist"."  assessments,  for a grand total of $819,998,036
in  insurer assessments during  1989 [NCIGF
Recent trends in insurer insolvencies  have  (1990)1.16
reflected  fundamental changes  in  the  risks
guaranteed  by the insolvency  funds.  Beginning  These figures represent the  latest in a
in  the  latter  part  of  the  1980s,  several  trend that has seen multi-state insolvencies of
multi-state,  multi-line  insolvencies  have  occurred  major proportions occurring during  the  last
resulting  in  large  assessments across  many  several years.  Historically, insolvencies were
states. While insurance  insolvencies  represient  a  concentrated  in regional companies  specializing
small fraction of insurance  companies,  they are  in nonstandard automobile risks.  The  1980s
becoming a sizable drain.  Note that the cost of  produced a rash of insolvencies  concentrated  in
insolvencies is  theoretically  spread  among  worker's  compensation, general liability, and
policyholders  of solvent companies  because the  automobile  liability  lines  in  multi-state,
cost of  assessments is added to the price of  multi-line  companies.  However,  the insolvencies
14were not distributed systematically. Over sixty  found in Ronn and Verma (1986) and Marcus
percent of  the assessment dollars during the  and Shaked (1984) for the banking industry.
period 1969-1989  were assessed on multi-state
companies during the last flve  years.  These  Currently,  the  main  regulatory
companies  represented  just eleven percent of the  early-warning  system  is  the  Insurance
total number of insolvencies  during the period  Regulatory  Information System (RIS),  a set of
[NCIGF (1990)].  This  translates to  twenty  financial ratios computed from  the insurance
insolvencies causing assessments of  over  $2  company's financial statements.  These eleven
billion, and this only represents  a portion of the  ratios are  computed for  all  companies, and
final assessments  to solvent insurers.  companies  with four or more ratios outside the
normal range  are targeted for enhanced  scrutiny.
However, these do not represent the total
costs. As companies  are liquidated,  assets  of the  The  IRIS system has  received strong
liquidated  company  are distributed  to the various  criticism  by the GAO recently [GAO (1991)] as
guaranty funds as they are to other creditors.  well as criticism from some academic sources
The defunct  insurer may  have sufficient  assets  to  [see Bar Niv and Hershbarger (1990)]. Part of
reimburse the  guaranty funds  in  full.  For  the criticism rests on the fact that each of these
instance, the Mission Group insolvency, which  ratios is equally weighted  under IRIS, although
was the largest to date at the time it occurred in  there  is  significant collinearity and  overlap
the mid-1980s, has resulted in guaranty fund  between the  ratios.  Additionally, they  are
payments of  $246.9  million through  1990.  computed  from  insurer-supplied  financial
Recently, the estate paid $107 million to state  information that  may be  manipulated by  an
guaranty funds, and the liquidators  expect to be  unscrupulous  insurer. This shortcoming,  as well
able to return even more in the future. To date,  as the system's inability to detect management
the recoveries and  funds held by other state  fraud, are serious limitations. The GAO report
insurance  departments  tota' almost  eighty  percent  also cited the  system's propensity to  falsely
of  the  total  assessments under  the  Mission  spotlight many companies  that are truly sound,
failure. 17 thus wasting scarce regulatory resources.  The
system is defended  by the NAIC as just one tool
Measures  of  Riskiness  of  Insurance  in the solvency  monitoring  process, but many  of
Companies. The topic of insolvency  indicators  these  criticisms  are  warranted  and  work
in  property/casualty insurance companies has  continues  on  development  of  enhanced
been a highly researched and reported subject  monitoring  devices.  The NAIC is aware of the
during the last decade.  Additionally,  there has  problem and continues  to search for resolutions.
been a  growing body of  published research
concerning the pricing of guaranty funds on a  Major Causes of Insurer Insolvency.  Several
risk-adjusted basis,  similar to  the  suggested  GAO studies [GAO  (1990a), (1989a),  (1987)] in
reforms  to  FDIC  pricing.  Guaranty fund  the  last  few  years  have  addressed  the
premiums are set at a flat percentage, and this  property/casualty  insurance  solvency  monitoring
results in  inequities as policyholders of risky  system. The NAIC has attempted to stave off
insurance  companies  are  subsidized  by  renewed  calls for federal regulation  by imposing
policyholders  and  shareholders  of  more  stricter guidelines and peer rating systems for
conservative,  safer companies. The bulk of the  assessing the ability of the individual states to
literature on this question  relates to the banking  monitor  insurers  domiciled in  those  states.
industry, but  Cummins (1988) developed an  Some of the problems  plaguing  various states in
options-based model for  insurance insolvency  their efforts  to control  insolvencies  in their states
guaranty fund premiums similar to the models  have centered  around a lack of funding  for their
15departments,  plus a dearth of trained, qualified  portfolio, loss and expense ratios, and payout
personnel  to implement  solvency  monitoring.  patterns but  with differing growth rates, the
insurer with the higher growth rate is in greater
While the problems of poor management  danger of  insolvency, simply owing to  the
practices,  fraud,  over-zealous growth,  poor  accounting  practices.
reserving techniques and  lax regulation have
been problems in  the  past,  the  reinsurance  Often the cash-flow  underwriting  process
problem is relatively new.  In several of the  accompanies  the growth process.  Obviously, if
recent large multi-state insolvencies, reinsurers  a  company can earn more on its  investments
refused to  honor  reinsurance treaties,  citing  than it loses in underwriting  business,  there will
fraudulent activities on  behalf of  the ceding  be some form of profit and no decay in capital.
companies.  This  has  resulted in  significant  However, the earnings have to be higher than
litigation, and has  prompted calls for tighter  the underwriting  loss and they must more than
regulatory controls on reinsurance transactions  offset  any  underwriting losses  in  order  to
and reinsurance accounting  [GAO (1989b)1.  maintain  capital.
Growth can cripple an  insurer simply  One of the major  problems  with cash-flow
because of  the  statutory accounting practices  underwriting is the mismatching  of assets and
mandated  by regulatory  authorities. The insurer  liabilities  that usually occurs.  There is a risk
may be  writing extremely profitable business,  that  interest rates  will decline sharply,  thus
but the accounting  system robs them of capital  decreasing  the yield  on securities  held because  of
faster than it can be earned.  This is due to the  lower  reinvestment earnings on  the  coupon
fact that expenses are recognized immediately  payments.  Conversely, interest  rates  could
while income recognition is  deferred, which  skyrocket, causing the price of the underlying
results  in  hidden  equity  for  the  insurance  security to decline and exposing the investor to
company that will only be  recognized if and  the  possibility of  having to  liquidate bond
when the insurer ceases to write new business.  holdings  well  below  their  carrying  value.
The higher the percentage of  losses to  total  Therefore,  with  mismatching of  assets  and
premiums, the longer hidden  equity is contained  liabilities,  the insurer opens itself up to a great
in the balance sheet, and the more contributed  deal  more  investment risk  than  it  would
equity  is  required  to  support  operations.  otherwise  experience.
Therefore,  absent  any  profit  or  additional
contributions  to the capital base, simple growth  Under-reserving usually accompanies a
will erode the capital of an insurance company  growth  strategy  or  cash-flow underwriting.
and force it into technical insolvency. The rate  When a company  begins taking on risks that it
of decay of the equity base is dependent on the  has no experience with, it often does so at a
rate of growth in premiums, the earnings rate,  loss.  The "good" business has already been
and the mix of loss and underwriting  expenses.  written, and  usually the only  way to  attract
substantial  amounts  of new business  is by cutting
Note,  however,  that  growth  is  rarely  the  price  substantially.  The  new  business
achieved  by  overpricing  or  by  breakeven  attracted by price is often less desirable than
pricing, but usually by below-cost  pricing. It is  existing business, but often the insurer uses the
possible for a company  to grow at such a rate  same  existing  reserving  techniques  to address  the
because  of investment  earnings,  which  more than  new business.  For  instance, if  the  existing
offset  the  losses  in  underwriting  earnings.  business generates a  frequency of  .10 and  a
However, it  is  still possible to  outgrow the  severity  of $10,000 then the pure premium (the
investment  earnings  as well. Given two insurers  expected  value of loss per unit of exposure) for
with  identical  policyholders,  investment  that  business is  $1,000.  The new  business
16dttracted may have a frequency of  .20 and a  be difficult to prove.  However, to the extent
severity of  $20,000 for  a  pure  premium of  that the delay allows the reinsurer to build up
$4,000, while the insurer continues  to price it  funds through higher premiums and investment
and reserve for it at the $1,000 pure premium  income,  it  could well be  to  the  reinsurer's
level.  Often, some allowance is made for the  advantage to  challenge payments to  insolvent
increased  risk of the new business,  but still there  companies  where there is questionable  business
is a perception  of desirability  that may not prove  judgement present.
true in the long run.
An additional regulatory problem is the
In recent years, unrecoverable  reinsurance  degree and sophistication  of the various states
has been cited as a major contributor  to several  with  regard  to  regulation of  insurers doing
of the larger insolvencies  experienced  during the  business  across state lines as poor regulation in
1980s. Reinsurance  experienced  a boom in the  one state can affect the consumers residing in
1980s  as  new  reinsurance  companies  another  state.  Recently,  the  NAIC  his
proliferated, either as stand-alone  companies  or  implemented  a  peer review system and other
as new divisions of existing companies [Webb  enhancements  to the solvency  regulatory  system.
(1988)].  There are relatively few controls on  HIowever,  critics contend  that the NAIC moves
the reinsurance business, as it is considered to  are a response to the increase in attention  from
be  an  insurance  transaction  between  federal sources." 8 J. Robert Hunter, president
knowledgeable  professionals.  Also,  the  of  the  National  Insurance  Consumer
international  nature of the reinsurance business  Organization,  cites Congressional  interest as the
renders state  regulation impossible, although  motivating factor behind the recent increase in
federal  regulation  of  some  sort  has  been  activity by the NAIC in this area."'
proposed for alien reinsurers, and may yet be
imposed  in some form for all reinsurers at some  Another perceived  problem  with the state
future date.  regulatory system  is  in  the  individuals who
perform  the  regulatory  function.  Many
The unrecoverable  reinsurance problems  insurance  commissioners  are perceived  (whether
of the recent past have stemmed partly from  rightly or  wrongly) as tools of the insurance
reinsurer unwillingness  to pay and partly from  industry,  too  weak  to  stand  up  to  major
reinsurer inability  to pay losses.  For instance,  insurance  companies  doing business  within  their
citing fraud  on behalf of  the direct  insurer,  area of responsibility. In some areas this may
several reinsurance companies  refused to honor  be partially  true; in other areas,  just the opposite
treaties under the  Mission failure [Rappaport  is true.
(1989): 11].  A class action suit has been filed
against  the  directors,  management  and  Whatever the causes of  the  individual
accountants  for Integrity Insurance  Company  by  states' regulatory weakness, the main factor is
the  New  Jersey  Insurance  Commissioner,  the individuality  of the regulatory effort.  In its
alleging fraud (among other causes) on their  current form, the regulators in  a given state
parts contributing  to the demise of the company.  must  concentrate  their  efforts  on  their
domiciliary companies,  leaving the  detailed
Another problem with  reinsurance has  supervision  of foreign companies  to other states'
been with the question of fraud on the part of  regulators. In the past, this system worked well
the  direct  insurers.  The  line  between  enough as  most  insolvencies were  regional
mismanagement  and fraud  is often nebulous.  prollems confined  to only one state, or perhaps
What could truly be incredible  stupidity on the  a  few  neighboring states.  The  insolvency
part  of  senior  management  often  looks  problems in  the  1980s have shown that the
suspiciously like fraudulent behavior, but may  pattern of insolvencies  has radically  changed.
17Table 2.1  Right Hand Side of the Balance Sheet Changes  over nime
LOSS  & LOSS
ADJUSTMENT UNEARNED
EXPENSE  PREMIUM OTHER
PERIOD  RESERVE  RESEBVE LIAB'S  SCURPLUS
1930-39  16.91%  29.46%  4.52%  46.29%
1940-49  19.77%  30.75%  5.29%  44.19%
1950-59  21.30%  31.78%  5.39%  41.53%
1960-69  26.58%  26.56%  5.63%  41.24%
1970-79  40.39%  21.73%  8.69%  29.18%
1980-88  47.52%  16.32%  8.30%  27.85%
Source: Raw data from Best's Aggregates  & Averages (1989).
Changing  environment. In addition  to regulatory  e)  the increased availability of information
weakness, management weakness or  lack  of  technology  in  the  form  of  desk-top
management  controls are often cited as a cause  computers,  enhancedoperating systems
of insurer insolvency. These are easy labels to  and improvements  in mainframe  software
apply, as  insolvency is  almost by  definition  and hardware;
"management weakness."  However, a  more
proper definition  is the inability  of management  f)  increasing competition  for the remaining
to  handle  successfully  changes  in  their  business after introduction  of alternative
environment. Some of the major changes  in the  forms of insurance protection, such as
insurance  environment  in recent years include:  risk-retention groups (RRGs), captives,
etc.;
a)  the increase  in the liability  portion  of total
losses;  g)  a hostile regulatory environment.
b)  the highly charged  volatility of  While this list is not exhaustive, it does
investment markets, coupled with very  give some insight to  changes in the industry
high  nominal  and  real  interest  rates  affecting  the way insurers do business, and by
during the 1980s;  extension  the  solvency  monitoring  systems
currently in place.  A brief discussion of each
c)  the liability crisis and increasing  factor follows:
litigiousness  of the American  society;
Increase  in the Liability  Portion of Total Losses.
d)  the  move  away  from  cartel  pricing  Table  2.1  presents  the  composition of  the
iewards a more market-driven  system;  right-hand-side  of the aggregate balance sheet
for stock insurance companies. As the table
18Table 2.2  Federal  Products  Liability  Suits Filed, 1974-89.
Year  Cases  flUs4  Percent changefrom
previous  year
1974  1,579  -
1975  2,886  83.0
1976  3,696  28.0
1977  4,077  10.0
1978  4,372  7.0
1979  6,132  40.0
1980  7,755  26.0
1981  9,071  17.0
1982  8,944  -1.0
1983  9,221  3.0
1984  10,745  17.0
1985  11,495  6.9
1986  14.153  23.1
1987  16,166  14.2
1988  13,408  -17.1
1989  18,679  39.3
Average  per year  19.8
% Change  from  72-89  1082.9%
Sources:  Annual Repors  of the Director  of the  Adrinistrative Office of the United
States Courts, vanous issues.
19Table 2.3  Performance  of the Mon-life  Industy over 7lne.
PERIOD  ROAUw  ROA,Nv LEVL LEVp  LEVo  ROAm.,  LEVM,L ROEAu.
1930-39  1.37%  2.19%  0.72  1.25  0.19  3.56%  2.16  7.70%
1940-49  1.41%  3.43%  0.80  1.25  0.21  4.84%  2.26  10.95%
1950-59  0.53%  5.15%  0.88  1.31  0.22  5.67%  2.41  13.67%
1960-69  -0.45%  3.87%  1.10  1.10  0.23  3.42%  2.43  8.29%
1970-79  -0.33%  5.22%  1.95  1.05  0.42  4.89%  3.43  16.74%
1980-88  -3.57%  7.42%  2.36  0.81  0.41  3.85%  3.59  13.81%
ROAuw:  Underwriting  profit return on assets = (Underwriting  Profit / Total Assets)
ROA,Nv:  Investment  profit return on assets =  (Investment  Profit / Total Assets)
LEVL:  Leverage factor attributable  to loss/l,.<  reserves =  ((Assets/Surplus)  * (Loss &
LAE Reserves / Total Liabilities))
LEVp:  Leverage factor attributable  to unearned  premium reserves = ((Assets/Surplus)  *
(Unearned  Premium  Reserves /  Total Liabilities)  )
LEVO:  Leverage factor attributable to  other liabilities =  ((Assets/Surplus)  *  (Other
Reserves / Total Liabilities))
ROAA,:  Total profit return on assets  =  ((Underwriting  +  Investment  Profit) / Total
Assets)
LEVA,:  Total leverage = (Sum of Leverage  Factors)
ROEAm:  ROAAm  x  LEVA,
Source: Raw data is from Best's Aggregates  & Averages (1989).
20shows, the proportion attributable  to  loss and  to insurers  that are unprecedented. For instance,
loss  adjustment expense reserves has  grown  a small insurer who once wrote general liability
substantially  over time.  This is due to the fact  insurance may  find  itself  on  the  brink  of
that the long-tail  liability lines have increased in  financial  ruin when the claims begin pouring in
volume over time,  with a  longer and longer  long after  the contract  has expired. If reinsurers
holding  period for reserves against  these losses.  are no longer available, serious problems may
There was an especially large jump in the late  arise.  This scenario is not  as unlikely as  it
1970s and  1980s that is continuing.  As the  seems, as judicial  interpretation of  insurance
distributions  illustrate,  the  major  changes  contracts  adds  a certain  amount  of whimsy  to the
occurred in each category  in the 1970s,  and it is  insurance  process.
these fundamental  shifts in the accounts of the
balance  sheet  representing  the  changing  Market-driven Pricing.  In  the past,  insurers
insurance environment.  The accounting and  used the same rates and bureau pricing was the
financial analysis  measures, however, have not  rule.  Increasingly, insurers (especially larger
kept  pace  with  the  changes,  nor  has  the  insurers)  are developing  rates based  on their own
regulatory community  with regards to solvency  data, and niche-pricing  and cost containment  are
assessment  and monitoring.  now feasible.  With the increasingly  segmented
pricing systems,  the move is away from the law
Volatility  of Investment  Income. As can be seen  of large numbers and more and more towards
in Table 2.2,  investment  income has been the  the law of pretty-big-numbers,  meaning  that the
predominant  source of income  for the aggregate  use of company-specific  data is more prone to
i,nurance portfolio for a  number of years and  error  than aggregate data for  all  companies
has become increasingly important  to the total  combined.  The  increasing volatility of  loss
return.  Additionally,  the increase in leverage  estimates  makes the individual  companies  more
(defined as  total  assets to  total  equity) has  prone to financial  difficulty.
increased  dramatically, owing to the increasing
amount of loss reserves in the balance sheet.  Information Technology.  Computers  have
This has  helped to  push down underwriting  allowed managers, actuaries, claims persons,
income,  as  these  losses  are  immediately  underwriters, and everyone in between more
recognized,  no matter that they will not be paid  opportunities  to increase productivity. This has
for a significant  number  of years. Nominal  long  also increased competition  among insurers, as
term treasury bond yields rose sharply in the  now a small insurance company can easily be
early  1980s and were at historical high levels  operated  on desktop equipment. The marketing
throughout  the 1980s.  force has gone to  the computer as  well, as
agencies become automated.  One effect has
The  Liability Crisis.  The  United States is  been to  make the  solicitation of  quotes or
becoming  more and more litigious as time goes  submission  of business faster as an independent
on, with the brunt of the financial  burden of this  agent is now able to  provide rate quotes by
litigiousness falling on  insurance companies.  dozens of companies  with the push of a button.
Table 2.3 shows the product liability  tort filings  One result has been that insurers are facing
in federal courts over the last 16 years.  These  increased  price competition,  which is detrimental
grew by an average of almost 20% per year.  to many companies' overall plans.  It becomes
The result is that insurers are paying  higher and  more difficult to differentiate companies based
higher awards, often for  risks that were not  on quality when the technology  explosion  has
envisioned when they accepted the insured's  resulted  in  the  production  of  much  price
premiums. The extremely long-tail  of some of  information  but almost no quality information,
these claims, which do not arise until years or  which  narrows  the  marketing focus  of  the
even decades  have  passed, creates  financial  risks  agency  force.
21Competition  From  Other  Forms  of  Risk  Harrington, Cummins, and Klein (1991) define
Management.  Businesses are  increasingly  the  cycle  as  a  series  of  events  occurring
turning to alternative  forms  of risk management,  regularly leadin-  back to  a  stationary point.
other than traditional insurance  as self insurance  Figure  2.1  shows the  combined  .atio  over
may be a more efficient alternative for certain  time. 2'  As can be  seen in  the figure, there
insurance consumers. The very good business,  appears  to be a cyclical pattern in the combined
the preferred business, is the business that is  ratio.  Since 1934  there have been eight cycles.
moving to alternative forms.  The Economist  Normally  the period from trough to trough has
states  that  thirty  percent  of  the  industry's  averaged about 6 years.  However, towards the
commercial  business  has  switched  to  self  late 1970s  to the present the period seems to be
insurance.21  Simple economic logic dictates  increasing.  The  latest  period  also  had  a
that  insureds with better experience who are  combined  ratio above 100 for sustained  periods
lumped in with insureds  with poorer experience  corresponding  to the time period of the liability
will eventually  form their own insurance pool  crisis.
with similar preferred risks. The increasing  use
of  captives,  risk  retention  groups,  and  The NAIC commissioned  a study on the
administrative-services-only  arrangements  underwriting cycle.  The  authors  found  a
contribute  to the increasing  risk of the remaining  number of theoretical reasons for the  cycle's
insureds, who are by and large a more volatile  existence  and provided  empirical  support. Some
group.  This makes the solvency issue for an  conclusions  of the report are that the cycle is a
individual insurance company a  much more  result  of numerous  factors  that are outside of the
lively topic.  control of  the  government.22  For  example,
Harrington  and Danzon  (1991)  believe  that price
Adversarial  Regulatory  Environment. Insurance  cutting  behavior of  the  firms  is  related to
regulators, spurred by legislatures  and bellicose  differences in  insurer expectations about the
consumer advocates, are increasingly  focusing  future as well as excessive  risk taking by snme
on the process of restricting premiums rather  firms.  The government can not regulate the
than ensuring adequacy.  The propagation of  insurer's expectation  formationprocess,  although
Proposition 103-like legislation throughout the  it can prohibit  the insurer  from accepting  certain
country during the last several years is clear  risks, but to do so would deny insurance to  a
evidence. Even where  these measures  have  been  buyer.  In addition, Doherty and Garvin (1991)
defeated (either at the polls or  in court), the  find that  interest rate changes may trigger the
message has  been  sent  that  consumers are  market's switch between  hard and soft markets.
unhappy with the product, and are looking for  Again, the state governments are not able to
ways  to  materially  change  the  operating  affect interest rate policy.
environment where  insurers operate.  The
current emphasis  is on personal  lines insurance,
but the last market cycle produced a legislative
reaction in the form of the risk-retention  act for
commercial  insureds,  and the next  one will spark
who-knows-what new  form  of  competitive
disadvantage and  changes  in  the  business
environment.
Underwriting  Cycles.  The  U.S.  non-life
insurance  industry  experiences  a profit cycle  that
is linked to the medical malpractice crisis, the
auto liability crisis,  and  the  solvency crisis.
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Figure  2.1  Cyclicality  in the Underwriting  Cycle  using  the Combined  Ratio
H.  Responses  to these Crises  In  addition, the attorneys  general for
twenty states brought suit against the major
All of the above problems  are at the  insurers  alleging  antitrust  violations not
forefront  of the state and federal  government's  protected by  the  McCarran-Ferguson  Act
attempts  to reform or  regulate  the insurance  exemptions. The attorneys  general  claim that
industry. California  has reacted  by imposing  the  industry  engaged  in  boycotts  and  intimidation
strict price regulation  on politically  sensitive  to (1) alter  general  liability  policies  from claims strict~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~~~~md  tolc  occurrence;  (2) to  excludeaccidental
products  like  automobile  insurance,  repealed  the  made to occumfence;  (2) to exclude  accidental
California  antitrust  exemption  for insurers,  and  pollution from coverage; and  (3) to  limit
allowed  banks  to market  insurance  to the  public.  insurance  company  obligations  to cover  defense
T.hese proposals were designed to  increase  costs of the insured.  The attorneys  general
Thmpesetion,  proposals  monopoly  pricing, and  believed  that the insurers' ability to  collude competition,  prohibit monopoly  pricing, and
promote  efficiency.
23allowed  them to reduce  coverage  and availability  liability, placing damage caps, or requiring a
that help to cause the liability crisis.  pre-litigation affidavit from another physician
stating  whether  the  physician  believes
Other state-based regulatory approaches  malpractice  has  occurred,  may  reduce
have been  to change  legislatively  the tort liability  malpractice  rates.  However, tort reform does
system.  For  example,  states  enacted tort  not necessarily  result in a welfare improvement
reforms to minimize the effects of the (in the  as it tends to limit plaintiffs  rights rather than
most part) judicial expansion of  tort liability.  limiting frivolous lawsuits and it rarely speeds
With  the  medical  malpractice crisis  came  up the compensation  process for truly injured
damage  limitations,  limits  on  the  use  and  plaintiffs.'
amounts of  punitive damages, elimination of
joint and severable liability,  and required  the use  Since the regulation  of insurance  and the
of an offset for collateral payments made by  tort  system  are  both  state  concerns,  these
insurance  or other third party payers to reduce  responses are  completely within the  states'
the total award.  It is interesting  to note that as  prerogatives. However, there are some federal
the  judicial  system  expanded the  rights  of  concerns that may supersede or  complement
plaintiffs  or expanded  the scope of liability for a  state  regulation.  The  first  concern is  the
defendant, the legislative branch has sought to  problems  posed  by  fifty-one  political
reduce plaintiff rights or reduce the amount of  jurisdictions each having their own products
the defendant's responsibility.  liability law.  Foreign industries  claim that the
multiple state products liability laws act as a
Proposals for  tort  reform,  which  are  barrier to entry as state standards  often conflict.
intended  to lower the overall tort costs as well as  Congress  is reluctant to enter a traditional  state
to enhance predictability of future costs, have  domain, but since most products liability cases
met  opposition from  the  legal  profession.  are heard in federal court, the federal interest is
Currently, federal proposals  for tort reforms are  arguably  strong  enough  for  congress  to
being  debated  that  would  result  in  severe  standardize the  laws through the  use  of  its
restrictions on punitive damages, would lessen  commerce  power.
the  rampant costs inherent in  the  discovery
process,  and  would  restrict  access  through  An additional area of federal concern is
modification  of the contingency  fee system for  the potential repeal of the McCarran-Ferguson
lawyers.  Whether these reforms or any similar  Act's  limited  antitrust  immunity  for  the
reform measures  will ever be implemented  is an  insurance industry.  By repealing the antitrust
important question  for the business community  exemption,  it is felt that competition  will coerce
as a whole, and for liability  insurers in particular  the industry into providing "fair" prices and
[Caroll (1987)1.  prevent it from restricting availability through
anti-competitive  means.
Numerous studies of the effects of tort
reforms on medical  malpractice  rates exist. Tort
reforms,  such  as  reducing  the  statute  of
limitations, changes  in joint and severable
24III.  The Economics of the U.S. Non-Life Insurance  Industry
The  economics of  the  U.S.  non-life  party to third parties.  Many of  the lines of
insurance industry has received scant attention  insurance  are combinations  of both property and
compared  to  other  regulated  industries.  liability coverages, and  this  leads to  further
Telecommunications,  electricity production  and  distinctions  as well.  Insurance lines are often
distribution, and banking  have been the subject  classified as  either  "long-tailed" or  "short-
of study for many years, but thorough analyses  tailed," depending  on the relative length of the
of the non-life insurance  industry commenced  in  payout profile.'  Another common dichotomy
1973  with  Joskow's  examination  of  the  is between  personal  lines and commercial  lines,
industry's conduct, structure and performance.  with  the  former  being  insurance  coverage
This chapter examines  the economic  issues that  provided to  individuals and the  latter being
affect the non-life  insurance  industry  today. Part  insurance coverage provided to  businesses or
A contains  a description  of the scope of the U.S.  professionals.
non-life business leading to a discussion  of the
industry's structure detailed in Part B. Part C  In addition  to these categorizations,  there
focusses  on an analysis  of issues  surrounding  the  are the reinsurance  and surplus  and excess lines
industry's conduct and Part D concludes  with a  categories to  be  considered.  Reinsurance is
brief  discussion of  the  industry's  long  run  coverage provided to  insurance companies for
profitability.  risks  they  have  accepted.  The  reinsurer
reimburses  the primary insurer for all or part of
A. Major Categorizations  of  the losses that the primary insurer becomes
Property-Liability  Insurance  obligated  to pay to its policyholders.
In  cases where the commercial market The  major  lines  of  property-liability  fails to provide certain coverages, surplus or
insurance are usually categorized by the risks  excess lines insurance can fill the gap.  For
they protect against, although there does not  example,  in  recent  years  when  medical
exist  a single  definitive  listing of all of the lines.  malpractice  insurance  became  difficult  to obtain,
For  example, in  the National Association of  some physicians  turned to the surplus or excess
Insurance  Commissioners  (NAIC)  annual  lines  market  in  order  to  obtain  coverage.'
statement,  there are thirty-four categories  listed  While the surplus and  excess lines insurance
on the Exhibit of Premiums and Losses (Page  market  is  relatively small,  it  makes up  an
14).  There  are seventeen categories in  the  important  segment  of the industry and serves to
Exhibit of Losses and Loss Expenses (Schedule  partially  alleviate  some  of  the  market
P), the detailed historical loss and loss reserve  imperfections  faced by insurance  buyers.
exhibits.  In  the  A.M.  Best's  classification  There  is  relatively  little  regulation  and
system,  twenty  categories  are  provided.  supervision of  the  surplus  or  excess  lines
Obviously,  the total property-liability  insurance  market,  and  policyholders of  non-admitted
cake may be sliced in several ways.  carriers have no recourse to the guaranty funds
in case of insolvency. Property insurance  usually  provides first-
party'  protection for  either real  or  personal  Long-Tailed Lines of Insurance.
property either owned or  in the  care of  the
insured party.  Liability insurance generally  The  following  coverages,  with  the
provides  protection  for obligations  of the insured  exception of the automobile physical dahage
25portion  of automobile  insurance,  are what are  and  commercial  vehicles  on the road  today,  and
considered  the  "long-tailed'  liability  virtually all  of  these vehicles are  carrying
coverages.'  These lines are singled  out for  mandatory  liability  insurance  in one form or
special reporting in  the  common financial  another. Additionally,  practically  all financial
statements filed  annually by  all  insurance  institutions  making  automobile  loans  require  the
companies  (the NAIC  annual  statement  blank).  borrower  to maintain  physical  damage  coverage
These  lines  are considered  special  because  of the  on the financed  vehicle.
lengthy  delay  in the final  payout  of claims  and
the  concomitant  volatility of  underwriting  Obviously,  this line has a tremendous
results. Because  of the long  delays  in settlement  impact  on the property-liability  industry  as a
of claims,  these  lines  are especially  vulnerable  to  whole.  Recently, the  private  passenger
adverse  development  of loss reserves,  meaning  automobile  insurance  industry  has undergone
that the actual value of the claims payments  considerable  upheaval  because  of perceptions  of
exceeds the  expected value of  the  claims  over-pricing.  California  voters  opted  to impose
payments.  Of  course, the  possibility of  mandatory  rate rollbacks  on insurers in that
favorable  development also  exists,  with  state,  and  similar  measures  have  been  attempted
favorable  consequences  for the insurer.  in  many other jurisdictions.  The ultimate
decision on  the  legality of  legislated rate
Automobile Insurance.  Of  the  traditional  rollbacks  is still  meandering  its way  through  the
insurance  lines, the largest segment of  the  legal  system,  but in the meantime  the insurance
industry  is the automobile  market,  representing  industry  has received  extensive  criticism  from
over forty percent  of the total premiums. This  policyholders, regulators,  legislators,  and
line includes  both private  passenger  automobile  consumer  advocate  groups.
and  commercial  automobile  coverages,  although
the  private  passenger sector  dwarfs  the.  Workers  Compensation.  Another  major
commercial  market  (see Table  3.1).  There  are  coverage,  accounting  for slightly  over fifteen
two broad classes of  automobile  insurance:  percent of  total premiums, is  the  workers
liability  insurance  and  physical  damage  compensation  line.  This  line is also mandatory
insurance. The physical  damage  insurance  is  in most states  and represents  no-fault  coverage
first party property insurance  that reimburses  for injuries  suffered  by employees  at work. Tle
automobile  owners for damages  to their own  automobile liability line  and  the  workers
vehicles. Liability  insurance  usually  provides  compensation  line are the two most heavily
payments  to third parties  who  are injured  by a  regulated  of the common  insurance  lines,  owing
negligent  policyholder,  although  no-fault  to the mandatory  nature and the widespread
coverages  are mandatory  in a number  of states.  coverage  afforded  under  these  lines. Recently,
The no-fault  coverage  provides  medical  expense  the workers  compensation  line  has remained  in
reimbursement,  funeral  expenses,  and  lost  wages  a constant  state  of upheaval  and  turmoil. Often
to  all persons injured in  a  traffic accident,  the benefits  under workers  compensation  laws
regardless  of fault.  Additionally,  uninsured  are politically iotivated,  with  labor attempting
motorists  coverage  is also  often  available,  which  to  mandate the  widest and  most generous
provides  first-party  reimbursement  for  coverage  available. The relatively  long  payout
policyholders  who are unable  to recover  their  profile for this  line of  insurance  magnifies
liability  payments  from negligent  parties.  thesefluctuations  in potential  benefits,  as do the
large residual markets and tight controls  on
Part  of  the  size  of  this  market is  pricing.  Several  states  operate  workers
attributable  to the fact that automobile  liability  compensation  funds  competing  with  commercial
insurance  is mandatory  in the majority  of states.  insurers for market share, further restricting
There are almost  200 million  registered  private  pricing  freedom. In recent  months,  conflicts
26Table 3.1  Size and Relative Performance  of Lines of Business in the Non-Lofe  Industry
(1989).
NET
WRrITEN  % OF  LOSS  EXPN  COMB.
LINE OF BUSINESS  PREMIUMS  TOTAL  RATIO  RATIO  RATIO
FIRE  $4,442,378  1.93%  62.6%  43.6%  106.1%
ALLIED  2,134,233  0.92%  70.4%  40.1%  110.5%
FARM OWNERS  MULTI-PERIL  992,S26  0.43%  77.4%  39.8%  117.3%
HOMEOWNERS  MULTI-PERIL  18,S41,4S9  8.03%  81.6%  41.S%  123.1%
COMMERCIAL  MULTI-PERIL  17,887,542  7.75%  70.6%  S1.8%  122.4%
OCEAN  MARINE  1,172,246  0.S1%  83.0%  43.8%  126.8%
INLAND  MARINE  4,416,930  1.91%  59.8%  42.S%  102.3%
FINANCIALGUARANTY  624,96S  0.27%  41.3%  48.6%  89.9%
MEDICAL  MALPRACTICE  4,177,617  1.81%  86.S%  49.S%  136.1%
EARTHQUAKE  S24,031  0.23%  27.3%  32.8%  60.0%
GROUP ACCIDENT  & HEALTH  4,S52,175  1.97%  87.0%  19.6%  106.6%
CREDIT ACCIDENT& HEALTH  208,979  0.09%  51.9%  42.2%  94.0%
OTHER  ACCIDENT  & HEALTH  2,256,851  0.98%  80.8%  30.9%  111.6%
WORKERS  COMPENSATION  35,254,680  15.28%  94.1%  27.3%  121.4%
OTHER  LIABILIrY  18,103,227  7.84%  83.0%  54.0%  136.9%
PRIVATE  AUTO LIABILrSY  47,780,850  20.70%  95.0%  36.7%  131.7%
COMM AUTO  LIABILITY  12,170,24S  5.27%  84.9%  42.9%  127.8%
PRIVATEAUTOPHYS.DAMACE  30,476,133  13.21%  71.2%  31.1%  102.2%
COMM AUTO  PHYS. DAMAGE  4,732,866  2.05%  58.7%  38.9%  97.6%
AIRCRAFr  396,742  0.17%  93.8%  43.7%  137.5%
FIDELITY  906,784  0.39%  59.1%  40.2%  99.3%
SURETY  8,074,456  3.50%  28.4%  77.3%  105.7%
GLASS  18.286  0.01%  33.8%  64.2%  98.1%
BURGLARY&THEFT  109,291  0.05%  27.9%  43.3%  71.2%
BOILER&MACHINERY  661,895  0.29%  67.1%  53.1%  120.2%
CREDIT  397,340  0.17%  62.1%  46.9%  109.0%
INTERNATIONAL  191,702  0.08%  112.2%  29.9%  142.1%
REINSURANCE  7,715,076  3.34%  87.3%  34.8%  122.2%
AGGREGATE  OTHER  LINES  1,850,467  0.80%  68.7%  38.6%  107.3%
TOTAL, ALL LINES  230,771,972  100.0%  80.9%  39.S%  120.4%
Source: NAIC  Annual Statement  Compilation  Tapes (1990).
27over the future size and scope of mandatory  alternatives  to  purchasing  insurance  from
workers compensation  benefits have been at the  traditional sources.
heart of budget  problems in several states.
Special Liability Insurance.  Three  lines of
Other Liability. While it is not the largest line,  insurance clustered  together  under  the  title
the Other Liability line represents one of the  "Special Liability" in Schedule P of the NAIC
most  volatile of  the  lines.  This  coverage  Annual Statement are  the  Aircraft  line,  the
provides indemnity  for an insured who becomes  Boiler  and  Machinery line,  and  the  Ocean
legally obligated to  pay  damages to  a  third  Marine line.  The Aircraft line consists of first-
party, such as under a product liability suit.  party  hull  coverage as  well  as  third-party
This  coverage provides  not  only  protection  liability coverage for both passengers and non-
against judgements for special, general and/or  passengers arising  out  of  the  operation  of
punitive damagesg but also pays legal expenses  aircraft.  Boiler  and  Machinery  insurance
during the litigation phase.  In recent years,  provides coverage for losses resulting from the
insurers have been held liable for payments on  breakdown  of  boiler  equipment  or  other
claims that were not originally  envisioned  under  equipment used in  the  control, transmission,
this coverage, such as asbestos-related  suits and  transformation,  or  use  of  mechanical  or
environmental damages.  Damages for  these  electrical power.'  Ocean Marine insurance,
claims  often  take  many  years  to  manifest  which is perhaps the oldest form of property-
themselves, and as such may return to haunt an  liabil:ty  insurance  and  owes  much  of  its
insurer many years after the expiration of the  distinctive  nature  to  historical  evolution,
policy. The propensity  of the judicial system to  provides hull insurance, cargo insurance and
impart coverage into long-expired  contracts has  Protection  & Indemnity (P&I)  insurance  for sea-
contributed  significantly  to the volatility of this  going vessels.  The hull and cargo insurance is
line of insurance.  primarily a property coverage, while the P&I is
third party liability  protection.
Multiple Peri Insurance. The multi-peril  lines
provide both property and  casualty coverage
under a single  policy. The Commercial  Multiple  Short-Tailed Lines of Insurance.
Peril  package policies are the most common
form of business  insurance in use today.  Other  The remaining coverages  are considered
multiple  peril  lines  provide  coverage  for  the less risky portion of the  total  insurance
homeowners  and farms.  industry with regard to loss development. They
are relatively quick to  pay oiit,  and adverse
Medical  Malpractice.  This  represents  a  development,  while still possible, appears more
professional  liability  coverage  for  medical  rapidly.  A brief discussion of some of these
personnel  and hospitals. Formerly, this line was  lines follows, but the potential impact of these
included  in the Other Liability line but has been  lines is  less  severe than the  aforementioned
carried separately  since the 1970s. This line of  coverages,  with the exception  of the Earchquake
insurance is extremely volatile and difficult to  line.
price properly. There are relatively  few medical
malpractice  claims, but the size of the individual  Earthquake.  Coverage for damages caused by
claims  has  become  a  growing  concern.  earthquakes is  very  limited,  because of  the
Volatility  in this line erupts periodically  because  difficult)  in  predicting losses and  the  non-
of  pricing  fluctuations, and  this  led  to  the  independence of  the  risk.'  This  peril  is
formation of a number of physician-sponsored  generally  excluded  from  coverage  under
mutual insurers during the 1970s as well as a  homeowners  or commercial  insurance, but may
number of risk retention  groups in the 1980s  as
28be purchased  separately. Government  estimates  coverage, Inland Marine insurance is subject to
of  earthquake damage resulting from a  large  less regulatory scrutiny than most other lines.
quake in  an  urban area  run into the tens of
billions of dollars, and such a catastrophe  could  Fidelity & Surety.  Surety is a guaranty by a
easily  swamp  the  entire  insurance  market.  third party to indemnify  the performance  of one
Because of the infrequency  of the occurrence,  of the parties to a transaction. For example, a
this  coverage is  often omitted by  insurance  contractor is required to provide a surety bond
purchasers. However, during the recent tide of  guaranteeing financial restitution should  the
publicity about  the  possibility of  a  major  contractor  be unable  to complete  the construction
earthquake in  the  New  Madrid  fault  area,  of a building. The surety would then reimburse
purchases  of  this  supplemental  coverage  the person who is harmed by the contractor's
increased dramatically in  many areas of  the  failure to complete  the contract. Fidelity bonds
country. The government  is considering  making  protect against dishonesty, and these lines are
the purchase  of earthquake  coverage mandatory  usually thought of as a set, although there are
on federally insured mortgages in the future,  differences in protection.
much  the same as flood insurance  is required in
certain areas.  B.  Structure  and Relations among
Fire/Allied Lines.  Fire  and  Allied  Lines  Structural  Elements
insurance is traditional first party coverage for
damages to real property.  Fire insurance was  A basic methodology for  analyzing the
one of the first lines to be available to a wide  economics of  an  industry  is  the  Structure-
number of consumers and the flrst regulated.  Conduct Performance paradigm (SCP).  This
Today,  the  fire  insurance  policy  is  a  paradigm allows  economists to  describe  an
standardized document, although the attached  industry's  behavior  and  place  it  on  the
forms and endorsements are not.  While the  continuum between pure  monopoly and  pure
premium volume in this line is relatively low,  competition. The structure  of an industry  relates
amounting  to 1.93% of 1989  total premiums,  the  to  concentration and  the  ability to  employ
rates the premiums  are based upon are relatively  market power due to the presence of barriers to
low  as well, so the premium volume is not  entry, institutional arrangements,  or  perhaps
indicative  of the widespread  protection  afforded  government regulations that  limit  entry  or
under this line.  restrict competition.  The examination of the
industry's conduct is  an  examination of  the
Inland Marine insurance. Inland  Marine, which  industry's use of market  power, pricing policies
is  a  somewhat  misleading term,  provides  to restrict competition,  or non-price  competition,
protection  to property in transit, property in the  or  opportunities to  collude that may provide
custody of  bailees,  and  "floating" property.  market power  to  the  firms  in  the  industry.
Inland Marine arose out of the Ocean Marine  Finally,  performance concerns the  long  run
line  and  originally  covered  protection  for  profitability of the industry and its dynamics.
transportation of  goods in  transit on  inland  Profits and innovation are the major focus of
waterways and on roads.  Types of risks that  this  line of  analysis.  Thus, a  concentrated
may  be  covered  under  an  Inland  Marine  industry with  high  barriers  to  entry,  above
insurance policy are spelled out in the "Nation  normal profits, and no innovation  is closer to a
Wide Marine Definition" promulgated by the  monopoly  while an industry with no abnormal
NAIC and includes  a host of diverse  assets from  profits, low barriers to entry, and innovative
personal  jewelry  to  bridges  and  tunnels.
Because of  the  diversity  of  this  catch-all
29products  is more  like  the competitive  ideal.
Table 3.2  Four,  Eight,  and  7wenty Finn  Concentration Ratios Based  on  Total
Premiums Written, Total  Admitted Assets and Total Surplus (1990).
CR 4 CR,  CRm
Total  Premiums  9.19  13.76  21.27
Total  Admitted  Assets  16.19  22.54  37.70
Total  Surplus  14.33  22.17  36.56
Source: NAIC  Annual  Statement  Compilation  Tapes  (1990).
The U.S. non-life  insurance  industry,  as  For assets  and surplus  the industry  looks
mentioned  in Chapter  I and described  above  in  a bit more concentrated  with the top 20 firms
part A, is not  a monolithic  industry. However,  holding  approximately  thirty-five  percent  of the
even  when  taken  as a whole,  the industry  is not  total admitted  assets  and surplus. Although  the
very concentrated  as shown  in Table  3.2.  The  industry  looks more concentrated,  these ratios
table shows the four, eight, and twenty  firm  when  compared to  the  1982  Census of
concentration  ratio  for  the  entire non-life  Manufacturers  average industrial four  firm
insurance industry in  terms of  premiums,  concentration  ratio  are extremely  low.  In 1982,
surplus, and assets.  Multiple  market share  for example,  the  average  four  firm  concentration
measures  are helpful  especially  in the case  of a  ratio  was approximately  thirty-eight  percent.
service  industry  when  the correct  definition  of
the industry's output is subject  to  debate or  On a more disaggregated  level, similar
measurement  problems. In terms  of premiums  conclusions  can  be drawn. Table  3.4 shows  the
written, the top four firms  have less than ten  Herfindahl index for each state for a  few
percent  of the market. Only  by increasing  the  important  lines.  Only  the medical  malpractice
number  of firms  to the top  twenty  firms  does  the
concentration  ratio  double.
30Table 3.3  Distribution  of Companies  and Premiums  Among the States
Panel  A. Distlbution  of Companies  by Number  of State  Licenses
NO. OF
STATE  NO. OF  CUMULATIVE
LICENSES  COMPANIES PERCENI  PERCENT
1  1,189  45.8%  45.8%
2-5  407  15.7%  61.5%
6-10  179  6.9%  68.3%
11-24  241  9.3%  77.6%
25-39  186  7.2%  84.8%
40 +  395  15.2%  100.0%
TOTAL  2,597  100.0%  100.0%
Panel  B. Distribution  of Active Non-life  Insurance  Companies  tby  Number  of States with
Positive  Direct  Wriftten  Premiums  (1989).
NO. OF
STATES  NO. OF  CUMULATIVE
ACTIE  CMPANIES  PERCENT  PERCENT
1  959  42.5%  42.5%
2-5  415  18.4%  60.9%
6-10  174  7.7%  68.6%
11-24  223  9.9%  78.5%
25-39  140  6.2%  84.7%
40 +  346  15.3%  100.0%
NO. OF  MILLIONS  OF
STATES  NO. OF  DOLLARS  OF  PERCENT
ACTE  COMPANIES PREMUM  OF TOTAL
1  959  $24,060  10.8%
2-5  415  $13,452  6.1%
6-10  174  $8,105  3.6%
11-24  223  14,163  6.3%
25-39  140  11,570  5.1%
40 +  336  $154,634  68.4%
TOTAL  2,257  $221,084  100.0%
Source:  NAIC,  Annual  Statement  Compilation  Tapes  1989.
31Table  3.4  Herfindahl  Indices  for Important  Lines (1990).
LIAB  DAM  LIAB  D'AM
PERS'L  PERS'L  COMM'L  COMM'L  COMM'L  MED
STATE  FIRE  AUTO  AUTO  AUTO  AUrO  WORK  OTHER  MULTI-  MAL
ALASKA  0.059  0.116  0.106  0.059  0.044  0.069  0.051  0.051  0.280
ALABAMA  0.024  0.087  0.088  0.026  0.015  0.027  0.027  0.021  0.427
ARKANSAS  0.037  0.068  0.061  0.017  0.015  0.028  0.02S  0.018  0.273
ARIZONA  0.024  0.055  0.053  0.040  0.015  0.130  0.028  0.019  0.188
CALIFORNIA  0.020  0.056  0.055  0.015  0.012  0.034  0.025  0.021  0.082
COLORADO  0.019  0.071  0.058  0.018  0.013  0.096  0.025  0.023  0.268
CONNECTICUT  0.026  0.025  0.025  0.025  0.027  0.029  0.038  0.021  0.135
WASHINGTON,D.C.  0.049  0.060  0.059  0.026  0.092  0.027  0.038  0.027  0.247
DELAWARE  0.023  0.063  0.066  0.021  0.021  0.024  0.068  0.017  0.14S
FLORIDA  0.019  0.062  0.065  0.015  0.013  0.026  0.020  0.018  0.092
GEORGIA  0.014  0.061  0.052  0.012  0.011  0.021  0.027  0.015  0.218
IOWA  0.032  0.053  0.045  0.023  0.020  0.021  0.022  0.017  0.216
IDAHO  0.021  0.061  0.053  0.035  0.016  0.110  0.020  0.021  0.216
ILLINOIS  0.016  0.094  0.074  0.011  0.011  0.026  0.026  0.012  0.277
INDIANA  0.016  0.091  0.043  0.014  0.012  0.018  0.019  0.020  0.174
KANSAS  0.018  0.071  0.059  0.020  0.016  0.024  0.020  0.022  0.1S4
KENTUCKY  0.023  0.067  0.055  0.013  0.015  0.025  0.022  0.022  0.115
LOUISIANA  0.021  0.096  0.091  0.018  0.015  0.040  0.024  0.024  0.209
MASSACHUSEI7S  0.019  0.044  0.043  0.038  0.035  0.046  0.032  0.014  0.076
MARYLAND  0.017  0.0S9  .1.049  0.014  0.014  0.019  0.027  0.018  0.241
MAINE  0.023  0.031  0.029  0.035  0.037  0.080  0.023  0.027  0.253
MICHIGAN  0.024  0.084  0.071  0.028  0.021  0.033  0.077  0.015  0.164
MINNESOTA  0.022  0.064  0.061  0.023  0.016  0.022  0.024  0.015  0.224
MONTANA  0.018  0.081  0.070  0.021  0.014  0.023  0.028  0.013  0.069
MISSISSIPPI  0.031  0.061  0.069  0.037  0.032  0.034  0.037  0.037  0.287
MONTANA  0.026  0.076  0.063  0.033  0.023  0.051  0.018  0.040  0.170
NORTH CAROLINA  0.019  0.044  0.045  0.015  0.014  0.027  0.021  0.015  0.225
NORTH DAKOTA  0.030  0.046  0.048  0.026  0.026  0.156  0.024  0.020  0.188
NEBRASKA  0.044  0.064  0.058  0.028  0.029  0.019  0.023  0.019  0.241
NEW HAMPSHIRE  0.017  0.028  0.028  0.029  0.031  0.027  0.028  0.018  0.098
NEW JERSEY  0.019  0.044  o.A47  0.018  0.020  0.028  0.040  0.014  0.243
NEW MEXICO  0.033  0.061  0.064  0.022  0.019  0.050  0.021  0.023  0.237
NEVADA  0.021  0.064  0.056  0.028  0.017  0.170  0.020  0.023  0.178
NEW  YORK  0.021  0.046  0.043  0.014  0.017  0.022  0.040  0.01S  0.138
OHIO  0.019  0.049  0.041  0.019  0.012  0.091  0.024  0.021  0.154
OEKLAHOMA  0.016  0.063  0.056  0.022  Al.019  0.026  0.025  0.021  0.280
OREGON  0.019  0.066  0.053  0.025  0.01S  0.127  0.016  0.018  0.176
PENNSYLVANIA  0.017  0.042  0.051  0.014  0.015  0.021  0.030  0.014  0.133
RHODE  ISLAND  0.023  0.035  0.037  0.025  0.030  0.073  0.034  0.015  0.098
SOUTH CAROLINA  0.015  0.076  0.070  0.015  0.015  0.031  0.021  0.016  0.333
SOUTH DAKOTA  0.024  0.045  0.042  0.025  0.021  0.021  0.012  0.017  0.335
TENNESSEE  0.026  0.069  0.054  0.014  0.015  0.026  0.027  0.016  0.315
TEXAS  0.019  0.07_  0.069  0.015  0.012  0.026  0.035  0.015  0.091
UTAH  0.031  0.068  0.056  0.025  0.017  0.024  0.027  0.025  0.368
VIRGINIA  0.021  0.055  0.049  0.016  0.018  0.019  0.025  0.017  0.210
VERMONT  0.026  0.039  0.035  0.030  0.032  0.028  0.028  0.022  0.396
WASHINGTON  0.021  0.046  0.044  0.021  0.015  0.109  0.023  0.019  0.159
WISCONSIN  0.024  0.046  0.047  0.020  0.017  0.020  0.020  0.016  0.162
WEST VIRGINIA  0.027  0.104  0.089  0.028  0.027  0.094  0.032  0.035  0.144
WYOMING  0.019  0.082  0.069  0.028  0.021  0.073  0.036  0.035  0.257
UNrIED  STATES  0.015  0.057  0.053  0.010  0.012  0.019  0.033  0.014  0.040
Source:  Author's  Calculations based on data from NAIC, Annual Statements Compilation Tapes (1990).
32market  has any real concentration  as measured  For the entire U.S. market by line of
by the  Herfindahl  index.  As a result of the  business  the Herfindahl  index  is very small  as a
earlier  malpractice  crisis,  many  states  have  only  result  of  the  relatively large  number of
one or  two major providers other than a  companies  writing  in one  state. The Herfindahl
physicianowned  malpractice  insurance  company.  index for the entiri  market based on  total
Thus, it is expected  that the Herfindahl  index  premiums written for  all  lines is 0.0124.3
will be  relatively high compared to  other  Normally,  an important  question  to address  is
lines. 3"  the relevant  market,  but with  national  and state
Herfindahl  indices  of this  size, it is clear,  based
Table 3.5 tells a slightly  different  story.  on this measure  alone,  that concentration  is not
First, if firms  rather  than  groups  are examined,  a problem in the non-life insurance  industry
the top 300  companies  provide  about  two-thirds  whether  the state or national  market is used.
of  all premium dollars.  Thus, there are a  Thus,  no matter  how  the market  is divided,  the
relatively  large number  of small firms in the  concentration  appears  low in absolute  value  and
market.  This  is  consistent with  low  in relation  to other  industries.
concentration  and Herfindahl  indices. This is
potentially  due to  the  fragmentation  of  the  Concentration  in an industry  can be the
industry caused by  state regulation  and tax  result  of either  natural  causes  such  as economies
policies.  For  example, New York has the  of scale  or unnatural  causes  such as regulation
Appelton  rule requiring  any  insurance  company  allowing  barriars to  entry.  Some of  these
licensed  to do business  in New  York  to abide  by  unnatural  causes are the result of government
New  York  law  in all other  states  [Meier  (1987)].  intervention  while  others  are possibly  the result
Since  New  York  laws  tend  to be stricter  in terms  of industry  collusion.
of investment  and  other  operational  restrictions,
firms set up separate  subsidiaries  rather than  Barriers to Entry
submit the  entire company to  New York
regulation.  In addition  some  states,  like  Illinois,  Entry  into  an insurance  market  is a simple
provide  a very strong  incentive  to incorporate  in  procedure  in theory, but significant  delays  and
Illinois to  avoid a substantial  discriminatory  costs may arise in practice.  The delays are
premium  tax differential  of two percent  [Grace  dependent  to  some degree on  whether the
and Skipper (1990)].  Thus there are many  aspiring  market  entrant  is an established  insurer
companies  set up to do business  only in one  seeking  to expand,  a new  subsidiary  company  of
state. This  increases  costs,  reduces  profits,  and  an existing  insurance  group,  or an entirely  new
increases  prices  to consumers.  creation.  Licensing  requirements  vary from
state  to state, and  may  be based  on such  criteria
Panel  B  in Table  3.5 shows  that  when  the  as  initial capitalization,  historical operating
firms are combined  into groups, almost  sixty  experience  standards,  asset  composition
percent  of the groups  account  for eleven  percent  standards,  and  personal  background  assessments
of the premium  volume. The  majority  of groups  of the officers  of the company. In addition,
are active  in less  than forty states. This shows  insurers  currently  licensed  to write  business  in a
a tremendous  fragmentation  that  is quite  possibly  state  that wish  to expand  their lines  of business
due  to  the  state  regulation of  business,  may  experienc;e  delays  in  obtaining the
restrictions  against interstate  commerce,  and  additional  licensing  agreements  needed,  although
state-based  protectionism  of the home  industry.  in  practice it  is simpler for an established
Thus, even  though  there  are low  concentrations,  company  to expand  into new  lines  than  it is for
it  should be  noted that there  are  also  a  a new insurer  to become  licensed  for the first
tremendous  number  of companies  that  write  very  time. Some  of the barriers  to be discussed
small  amounts  of business.
33Table 3.5  Distribution  of Groups and Premiums  among  the States
Panel  A.  Distribution  of Premiums  for Groups  by Number  of State  Licenses  (1989).
NO. OF
STATE  NO. OF  CUMULATIVE
LICENS$ES  COMPANIES PERCENT  PERCENT
1  33  14.4%  14.4%
2-5  19  6.6%  21.0%
6-10  33  8.3%  29.3%
11-24  30  14.4%  43.7%
25-39  99  13.1%  56.8%
40 +  229  43.2%  10U.0%
TOTAL  229  100.0%  100.0%
Panel  B.  Distribudon  of Non-l(fe  Insurance  Groups  by Number  of States with  Poslive
Direct  Written  Premiums  (1989).
NO. OF
STATES  NO. OF  CUMULATIVE
AC1  GROUPS  PERCENT  PERCEi
1  17  7.6%  7.6%
2-5  20  8.9%  16.4%
6-10  24  10.7%  27.1%
11-24  30  13.3%  40.4%
25-39  28  12.4%  56.8%
40 +  106  47.1%  100.0%
NO. OF  MILLIONS  OF
STATES  NO. OF  DOLLARS  OF  PERCENT
ACTIYE  GROUPS  REMIUM  QF TOTAL
1  17  $2,520  1.3%
2-5  20  $2,983  1.6%
6-10  24  $2,996  1.6%
11-24  30  $7,578  4.0%
25-39  28  $3,674  2.0%
40 +  106  $167,510  89.5%
TOTAL  225  $187,260  100.0%
Source: NAIC,  Annual  Statement  Compilation  Tapes, 1989
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below are product differentiation,  capitalization  time to complete  on a state-by-state  basis.  An
requirements,  the  often-lengthy  licensing  process  insurer must obtain a license from every state
itself, economies of scale, and marketing and  insurance department separately3 in  order  to
distribution  systems.  do  business  in that state.  The requirements  for
filing an application with individual states are
spelled out  by  statute,  but  there  may  be
Product  Differentiation.  Even  though  significant "unwritten" rules  or  regulations
concentration  is  very  low,  regulators  and  delaying the process.  For instance, the state of
consumer groups have complained about the  Connecticut only  accepts applications during
difficulty  in comparing  insurance  contracts  from  certain  months of  the  year,  and  significant
different companies. Insurers have an incentive  backlogs may exist in various states at various
to  engage  in  product  differentiation if  the  times. Additionally,  personality  clashes  between
consumer  caP  not  determine  whether  one  company personnel and harried regulators can
contract  is better than another. Some states  have  easily bump a  company's application to  the
mandated  that all companies  must use the same  bottom  of the stack. The process, which seems
policy form so that coverage limits and prices  relatively  simple on paper, often takes years to
are easily determinable  and comparable across  complete  without some form of intervention  by
contracts.  However, an FTC study concluded  hired lobbyists and may constitute  a significant
that consumers are really more sophisticated  barrier to expansion.'
concemning  prices  and  coverage  than  was
previously believed [Plummer (1985)1. Given  Economies  of Scale.  The level of quality and
that certain lines are very competitive  (e.g., the  service of insurance  companies, as well as their
auto and home-owners lines) the policies have  administrative costs, are strictly governed by
become more homogenous  and many times can  scale economy  rezcrictions. Larger insurers are
be  purchased over the phone with very little  better able to establish  regional and local claims
search costs for consumers.  centers,  purchase  better  data  processing
equipment,  and attract higher-quality  managers
Capitalization Requirements.  Capitalization  than smaller companies. However, the bulk of
requirements are  usually stated in  terms  of  the costs in property-liability  insurance, such as
minimum  paid-in capital (for stock companies)  the loss expenses, does not exhibit significant
or minimum contributed  surplus (for mutuals).  scale economies, although  the variability of the
In addition, there is a requirement  for additional  loss  estimates is  inversely related  to  size.
surplus,  irrespective of  organizational form.  Therefore, the scale economies  that do exist in
These requirements  vary significantly  from state  the  insurance business tend to  decrease the
to state.  States which have low capitalization  ability  of  smaller  and  newer  companies to
requirements tend to  attract a  relatively large  compete with  the  larger,  more  established
number of companies,  although  the average  size  companies. Thus, an entrant must enter with a
of the companies  will be small.  This places a  large enough  scale to be competitive. However,
larger regulatory burden on those states, as the  smaller firms may enter a  particular market
primary responsibility  for regulating insurance  niche and survive because economies of scale
companies  is  assumed  by  the  domiciliary  may be exhausted  at a smaller level of output  for
state.3  Several  states  also  require  newly  a particular line of business.
formed  or newly admitted  companies  zo  maintain
a  higher  capital  base  than  older,  more  There have been a number of studies on
established  licensed insurers.34  the measure unit of scale and scope economies
in  the  U.S.  non-life market  summarized in
The Licensing Process.  The licensing proc ss  Geelian (1986).  There  are  a  number  of
for an insurer may take a significant  amount of  problems with the empirical studies, related to
35definition of  output and  definition of  costs.  Because  the technology  to estimate these
Generally,  there  is  no  evidence  of  any  scale economies is relatively new, only three
diseconomies  of scale in the insurance  industry.  studies  exist  that examine  the insurance  industry.
Most  evidence  suggests  that  the  industry  Two examine the  life  industry [Kellner and
experiences increasing or  constant returns to  Mathewson (1983)  and  Grace  and  Timme
scale.  In fact, given the large number  of small  (1992)1  and one examines  the Canadian  non-life
insurers in the U.S.  it would be surprising to  insurance  industry  [Suret  (199  1)1. Although,  not
find anything  but increasing  returns to scale.  exactly identical to  the  U.S.  industry,  it  is
similar  enough  to  provide  a  rough  gauge
Most studies focus on the largest firms  concerning  economies  of scale and scope. Suret
and  thus these are  the firms  likely to  have  divided  his sample of Canadian  firms into three
constant (or  near constant) returns to  scale.  groups - small (with assets less than $CAN 40
Economic  theory  predicts  that constant  returns  to  million), medium (with assets between ($CAN
scale  (CRS) is  the  equilibrium position for  40 and $CAN 100 million), and large (with
competitive firms.  To the extent that a firm  assets greater than $CAN 100 million).'  For
could increase its output, the firm would desire  the medium  group there exists evidence  for scale
to  do  so  because  marginal  cost  is  still  economics for the entire study period (1986-
decreasing.  If  on the other hand decreasing  1988) while scale economies existed for small
returns exist, the firm would  reduce its output  to  and large firms only once out of three years.  In
the point where returns are constant because  addition, there  is  no  systematic evidence of
marginal  cost is increasing.  economies of  scope between the  two  main
product  lines  as  he  defined  them
One of the major problems with scale  (property/liability insurance  and  automobile
studies in the past is that they lumped  all outputs  insurance).
into one measure of output."  Thus, for multi-
line companies, all premiums from each line  Other economies of scale studies found
were  summed  into  total  premiums.  Any  increasing  returns  to scale disappeared  for larger
evidence  of  cost  savings  from  multiline  firms  [Allen (1974)], and  found evidence of
operations,  economies of  scope,  would  be  weak or non-existent  returns except for mutual
hidden by  this  methodology.  Economies of  auto companies  [Joskow (1973)].  Others have
scope potentially  exist due to the firm's use of a  found mixed evidence  [Johnson, Flannigan, and
shared input.  For example, a local telephone  Wiesbart (1982)],  but none of these older studies
network can handle both local and long distance  used  the superior methodology employed by
calls due to the fa;t that the network is a shared  Suret. It is likely that for the very largest firms,
input into the production of  local  and  long  constant returns  to  scale  exist and  that  for
distance calls rather than having two networks.  smaller firms, increasing  returns to scale exist.
With the replicative  investment,  it is cheaper to  Theoretically,  in the long run all firms shoul  I be
use  one network for the two services.  at constant returns to scale.  It may be that the
smaller firms can take advantage  of barriers to
In the insurance  industry, overhead  might  entry,  or  state  regulations,  or  product
serve the same purpose.  Overhead, i.e., those  diversification and still survive in the market
management  expenses  that would be incurred  to  even without  long run cost minimization.
provide one line of insurance, can be further
spread if a second line is also provided.  More  Weiss (1991) has attempted to examine
formally, economies  of scope exist if the cost of  another facet of this issue by directly  examining
producing  a given  output bundle  (A,B)  jointly is  the efficiency  of the non-life insurance  industry.
cheaper than producing  A and B separately.  Three categories of  efficiency are examined:
Technical efficiency, allocative efficiency, and
36scale efficiency. Technical inefficiency  occurs  starting  up their own system from scratch. The
when the firm is not operating on its production  downside of this is the fact that the costs are
possibility  frontier.  Allocative inefficiency  higher  for  distribution througn  independent
exists when the firm produces a non-optimal  agents, and competition is more tied to  price
output mix or employs  a non-optimal  input mix  than to  quality.  There has  been significant
to produce its output. Finally scale inefficiency  growth in the market share for direct writers of
occurs when inputs and outputs are not allocated  insurance in recent years because of the lower
in proportion  to the correct input  and price ratios  costs involved, and this  would operate as  a
so that the marginal revenue product is not set  significant  entry barrier to a new company  or to
equal to the inputs' wage rate.  a smaller company that could not  afford the
initial investment in personnel, equipment and
Numerous  reasons  could  exist  for industry  office space.
inefficiency. For example, lack of competition
or government  regulation  could cause  the firm to  Historically,  the  non-life  insurance
sub-optimize  or  misallocate  resources.  Weiss  industry  has relied upon agents  to sell insurance
finds  that  there  exist  potentially  large  to the public. These agents  are like independent
inefficiencies.  Capital is  over  utilized with  contractors and are often contrasted to  agents
respect to  labor  (allocative inefficiency) and  who are employees  of the insurance  firm.  The
capital is  not  used  in  the  correct  long  run  independent  agents  are  compensated  by
proportion to achieve scale efficiencies. Weiss  commissions  on premiums written.  In the past
also tested for  effects due to  regulation and  rate bureaus enforced  collusion  among  agents  by
found that for long-tailed  lines too much labor  not allowing  them to sell the insurance of non-
relative  to outputs was  used in competitive  states  member firms.  This collusion  and the power of
(allocative  inefficiency)  and for regulated  states  agents  has  attracted  attention  by  scholars
too little labor was used relative to outputs for  concerned  about  the efficiency  of the distribution
long-tailed  lines. Combined,  these  inefficiencies  system.
amount  to between 12.6 and 33% of average net
premiums.  Joskow  (1973)  found that, all other things
held constant, non-liability agency firms had
Weiss did not account for all government  expense  ratios almost eleven percent higher  than
regulations. For example, she did not account  firms  employing  their  own  agents  (direct
for regulations  tending to fragment the market - writers) in 1967. In addition, the expense  ratios
such as discriminatory  premium taxes or New  for auto insurers averaged  about six percent less
York's  Appelton Rule, nor did  she  examine  than  those of  fire  companies.  Since auto
other  structural  impediments  to  open  insurance  is arguably  more competitive  than fire
competition. However, if her most conservative  insurance,  Joskow  concludes  that  it  is
estimate of  12.6  percent  is  employed it  is  competition that drove down costs as agency
obvious that there are serious inefficiencies  in  firms competing against direct writers would
the non-life markets.  In addition, since state  have  to  cut  sato  commissions  to  stay
regulations  affect firms who do business  in many  competitive. N  -e  than when Joskow  undertook
states it is difficult to assess the effect of one  his original study there  was generally more
state's regulation  on any one firm.  regulation  and price collusion  among firms than
there is today.
Marketing  and Distribution  Systems. One cause
of inefficiency  in the non-life insurance  industry  A  second  study  by  Cummins  and
is thought to  be  its marketing system.  The  Vanderhei (1979) examined agency/direct cost
independent  agency system allows companies  to  differences  over time (from 1968  to 1976). This
use  existing distribution systems in  lieu  of  study  allowed  a  test  of  one  of  Joskow's
37hypotheses: competition  drives down expenses.  even though agency firms seemingly  are not as
If there was an eleven percent cost differential  efficient  as direct writers.  The relatively poor
between the two marketing  systems, one should  performance is  because  the  direct  writers'
observe firms  switching from  the  high  cost  growth has been greater.  As certain personal
system to the low cost system or agency  writers  lines become more homogeneous, one might
would cut costs in another part of the business.  expect  that  agency  writers  will  be  at  a
comparative disadvantage for  this  business.
Cummins and  Vanderhei find  that the  However,  when a face to face interaction  is truly
direct writers are significantly more efficient  required, the  agency system may provide a
than  agency  companies by  15-20  percent  desired service.  Thus, it is possible to see
(depending  on the measurement of costs used)  growth and continued viability of the agency
and this relationship  does not change  appreciably  system.
over time.  In addition, they found that these
inefficiencies  stem  from  the  marketing  Operating  Restrictions and Regulatory
distribution  function  rather  than  the  loss  Caused Inefficiencies
adjustment  function. Since 1972  the percentage
of business direct writers have written in the  In addition to  creating barriers to entry
auto lines has increased from 52 to 65 percent  for insurance companies and causing company
and in the fire lines from 28 to  53 percent.  inefficiency,  the various states impose  operating
Given that this is occurring, why do companies  restrictions as well that are designed  to dampen
still employ agents?  competition  among insurers and to limit insurer
risk-taking, as well as to protect the public and
It has been argued that agency operations  the  industry  from  an  insurer's  predatory
allow  for  a  higher  quality  service  to  the  practices.  The protection afforded to personal
customer.  However, in studies of agency and  lines  insurance  purchasers  is  customarily
non-agency  firms,  the  firm's  self-reported  superior to  that afforded to  commercial lines
quality indicators  were not statistically  different  purchasers,  based  on  the  assumption that
[Etgar  (1976)  and  Cummins  and  Weisbart  businesses  are better able to protect themselves
(1977)].  It may be that consumers  perceive a  than individuals.  Additionally, the regulatory
difference  that the retailers  do not, i.e., a face to  protection  for those lines of insurance  mandated
face meeting  with an insurance  representative  is  by law is generally greater than the protections
preferred  to  a  phone  conversation.  This  afforded  to non-mandatory  lines.
particular  assertion  has not been examined  in the
literature.  For  instance,  most  states  require
individuals to purchase third-party automobile
A second reason that agency firms are  liability insurance.  In  order  to  protect  the
able to compete  is that agencies  are getting  more  consumers who have been forced to purchase
efficient  and are able to provide  service at lower  this coverage, many states place restrictions on
costs. Cummins  and Vanderhei  have shown  that  insurers' ability to  cancel or  not  renew auto
this was not the case for 1967  to 1976. Barrese  insurance policies.  Additionally, most states
and Nelson (1992) examine the industry from  require insurers to file their rating plans and
1978 to  1990 and find that for  most years a  policy forms with the insurance  commissioner's
significant cost differential still exists between  office for approval, often in advance of their
direct writers and agency firms.  This suggests  use.  A few states, such as Texas and Virginia,
that agency  firms are still not cost efficient.  mandate identical language for all automobile
insurance policies to  insure uniformity of the
One further point:  agency firms  have  insurance product.  These restrictions limiting
increased their premiums written since  1967
38by law is generally  greater  than the protections  period  of time  after  implementation  of the rating
afforded  to non-mandatory  lines.  plan.  The insurance  commissioner  has the
option  of rejecting  the rate  filing  and  forcing  the
For  instance,  most  states  require  insurer  to suspend  the changes  to the rating  plan,
individuals  to purchase  third-party  automobile  or may simply  approve  the change. The final
liability insurance.  In order to protect the  category,  that of "No Filing Required",  means
consumers  who have been forced  to purchase  that  the insurer  is free to modify  its rating  plan
this coverage,  many  states  place  restrictions  on  as warranted  without  seeking  specific  approval.
insurers' ability to cancel or not renew auto
insurance  policies.  Additionally,  most states  Rating  laws vary by state and by line.
require insurers  to file their rating plans and  Generally  speaking,  personal  lines  are the most
policy  forms  with the insurance  commissioner's  stringently  regulated.  Some  states  require  some
office for approval,  often in advance  of their  form of  insurance department  approval for
use. A few states,  such  as Texas  and Virginia,  personal  lines  and workers  compensation  while
mandate  identical  language  for all automobile  disregarding  other  commercial  lines  rating  plans.
insurance  policies  to insure uniformity  of the  Most  states do not require  rate filings  for the
insurance  product.  These restrictions  limiting  Inland  Marine  line of insurance  because  of its
insurer  operating  freedom  have  been  justified  in  catch-all  nature. Additionally,  the stringency  of
the past as methods  of controlling  variability,  the rating law is often  modified  in practice  by
but there is evidence  that strict rate regulation  the insurance  commissioner's  office.  Certain
has the opposite  effect  on stability  of loss  ratios  states, even  though  they operate  under a 'Use
and that stricter  regulation  leads  to availability  and File' or "File  and Use" system,  are very
problems  [Tennyson  (1991)].  strict about allowing rate  increases in  the
personal  auto  lines.  These  operating
Rating  laws are generally  categorized  in  restrictions,  while  not codified,  are indeed  a fact
one of the following  four categories  ordered  of life for many  insurance  companies.
from  most  stringent  to least  stringent: a) "Prior
Approval",  b)  "File and Use", c)  "Use and  Harrington  (1984a and 1984b)  presents
File", and d)  "No Filing Required".  Prior  evidence  of the effect of state regulation  on
approval  laws require the insurer to receive  prices. In his study, he found  that loss ratios
permission  from  the  state  insurance  are higher (underwriting  "profit"  is lower) in
commissioner  prior  to implementing  any  changes  states  with  prior-approval  statutes.  Other  studies
in their rating  structure.'  by Witt and Urrutia (1983)  find insignificant
differences,  but a more rigorous analysis  by
"File  and  Use"  laws  require  the insurer  to  Cummins  and Harrington  (1987)  support this
submit  proposed  changes  in rating  systems  to the  result.  Specifically,  Cummins  and Harrington
insurance  commissioners office  prior  to  dissagregated  the data  and  analyzed  four  lines  of
implementation.  If the insurance  commissioner  business:  commercial  auto, private  auto,
has any objections  to the proposed  rates, the  homeowner's  and  general  liability.  They  found
insurer  must satisfy  those  objections  before  the  that  the average  price of private  auto insurance
filing is approved  and the  changes  may be  in a rtgulated  state  was 9 percent  lower  than  in
implemented. If there are no objections  from  a competitively  rated  state. Similar,  but  slightly
the insurance  commissioner,  the filed plan is  smaller  differences,  were found  for commercial
implemented  on its filed  effective  date.  auto insurance  and homeowners. However,
there  was no difference  at all for other  liability.
In a "Use  and  File"  state,  the  insurer  must
file a copy of the revised  rating plan with the  In a study  mentioned  above,  Weiss  (1991)
state insurance  commissioner  within  a specified  also found  distortions  in the production  process
39due to regulation. However, she also found that  the  common  stock  of  non-insurance
firms  operating  in  unregulated states  also  corporations,  effectively limiting attempts to
suffered  from  different  operational  inefficiencies.  diversify within other financial services areas.
This may be the result of the fact that a state's  Note,  however,  that  these  restrictions vary
regulation of  the  business of  a  multi-state  widely  and significantly  from state to state.
company  may have extra-territorial  results, that
is strict regulation in state A may lead to other  Also, insurers are sometimes  required to
inefficiencies  for the company  as a whole.  maintain  deposits within  the states in which they
operate. These deposits are often in the form of
Other  operating restrictions are  often  government securities (both federal and state),
extensions of  entry or  exit barriers, such as  but  also may be  in the  form of  cash,  bank
countersignature  laws. These require insurance  deposits or other specified instruments.  This
policies to be countersigned  by resident agents  requirement may be  waived by certain states
within a state and are an extension  of the entry  when the company's domiciliary state submits
barrier  with  regard  to  establishment of  a  certification that  the  required  deposits  are
marketing system.  Maintenance of minimum  maintained  in the domiciliary  state. The deposit
capital levels is an extension  of the capitalization  requirement was originally intended to provide
barrier, although the relatively modest levels of  a source of funds to guaranty the obligations  of
capital required for insurers in most states are  the insurer, but this necessity  has been largely
less of a barrier today.  superseded by the  introduction of  insolvency
guaranty funds in all states.  Still, the deposit
Additionally,  state-specific  quirks  must be  requirement  allows state insurance departments
addressed by  insurance companies, such  as  some measure of control over the actions of
Connecticut's  requirement  for  an  insurer's  foreign insurers doing business  in that state and
claims examiners to  attend a  state  licensing  thus acts as a check on their actions.
course prior to handling claims arising in that
state.  While  individually these requirements  Barriers to Exit
appear  to  be  reasonable,  they  do  impose
operating restrictions on multi-line, multi-state  Barriers  to  exit  may  be  even  more
insurers that must expend resources to  track  oppressive  to  an  insurance  company than
legislative and administrative  law changes (as  barriers to  entry, and those states with strict
well as the unwritten rules under which each  operating restrictions or  exit barriers tend to
insurance department operates) in each of the  have more difficulty in attracting new market
fifty states and to tailor operations  to meet those  participants. This is consistent  with competitive
diverse requirements.  market theory, which requires  ease of both entry
and exit.  While the property-liability  insurance
Furthermore, regulators and legislators  industry does  experience some  instances of
impose investment restrictions on  insurers in  regulatory impediments  to exit, insurers enjoy
order to ensure that they operate in a narrowly  relative  freedom  of  exit  from  markets.
defined  scope  as  insurance  companies.  Figure  3.1  shows percentage change in  the
Routinely, insurance companies are restricted  number of firms over time in the non-life lines.
from  investing freely  in  investment assets.  However, by examining  the numbers  of entrants
Typical restrictions may preclude investment  of  and exits  relative  to the total size of the industry,
more than five percent of  admitted assets in  the number is really inconsequential. Thus real
common stocks or  real estate, or  in any one  exits or a withdrawal from a market (i.e., to
class of investment  assets with the exception  of  cease writing premiums)are  not represented in
U.  S. government bonds.'  Insurers are also  the above  figure.
restricted from owning controlling interests in
40Many states have exit regulation  in place  seven were forced to relinquish all licenses and
because of the potentially long delay between  the  other  six  were  made  to  pay  large
receipt  of  premium  and  final  payment  of  penalties. 4"  Currently,  the  actions  of  the
obligations  in property-liability  insurance.  Some  Massachusetts  regulatory authorities, as well as
controls are necessary to  insure completion  of  similar actions by the  New Jersey  Insurance
contractual obligations for  insurers who are  Commissioner,  are being challenged  in court.
exiting a market voluntarily. Generally, this is
not  a  problem,  as  an  insurer may secure a  Figure 3.1 shows the percentage change
portfolio reinsurance agreement and cede  its  in the number of firms in the non-life insurance
business to another company and thus remove  industry over time.  As can be seen, the change
itself from the market.  Currently, the NAIC is  in the number of companies  seems to follow a
working on a model law in this area that would  cyclical pattern.  One reason for this pattern
spell  out  the  notification requirements and  might be due to the relationship  between entry
procedures for  this type of  transfer.  In the  and profitability. Since profits allegedly  follow
meantime,  in  order  to  maintain an  orderly  a  cycle, the  number of  entrants should also
withdrawal,  some  temporary  restrictions on  follow a cycle.  However, the change in the
policy cancellations  are used in some states in  number  of  firms  in  the  industry  is  not
particular lines.  For  instance, insurers are  necessarily  related to the "true" entrants into a
usually  required  to  give  some  form  of  market, as an established firm may just enter a
notification to  their  policyholders, with  the  new market by writing one dollar of insurance.
interval between notification and effective date  The  costs of  entry are  much lower  for  an
of cancellation  being decided by the state.  established  firm, so one would expect that most
entry would  be accomplished  through incumbent
Often these requirements  are spelled out  firms.  One measure of entry then would be the
in statutes or regulations, although "unwritten"  availability  of funds  to use to back new policies.
rules also often apply.  Prior to the vote on  A potential measure of this is company  surplus
California's Proposition  103, several automobile  representing  assets on hand that can be used to
insurers in that state voluntarilv  withdrew from  satisfy claims. 42 As can be seen in the figure,
the  market  or  ceased  taking  on  any  new  surplus seems to lead the percentage change in
customers;  after  passage  of  the  bill,  the  the  number of  firms.  This  suggests  that
restrictions on  withdrawal were  significantly  increases (decreases) in surplus is followed by
increased.  Some  of  the  more  risk-averse  entry (exit) of  new firms.  Since established
insurance companies  simply withdrew from the  firms have lower costs of entry, then it seems
market prior to the outcome of the referendum  likely that they will act sooner than a start-up  to
because of  the  potential of  significant exit  enter a market.
barriers.
Firms enter a market because there are
Regulatory  efforts at erecting  exit barriers  profits to be earned.  By plotting an accounting
come  in several forms.  Companies may be  measure  of  profit,  combined  income
simply barred from leaving a market, or they  (underwriting profit plus  investment profit),
may be required to surrender all licenses  rather  against the change in the number of companies
than solely  the license for an undesirable  line of  and the change in surplus, we see that changes
business, or  they  may  be  required  to  pay  in combined  income  seem to lead surplus  but do
significant  fines, fees or other monetary levies.  not seem to be related to the percentage  change
For  instance,  in  Massachusetts,  thirteen  in the number of firms.  Thus, profits seem to
companies  (representing  about  one-quarter  of the  attract entry and the industry is relatively
total  private passenger  automobile insurance
market) have withdrawn since 1986.  Of these,
41responsive  to changes  in profit levels.
Given  the  weak  evidence about  the  understate concentration as well as entry and
relationship  between entry and profits, further  exit.
study of the relationship  is needed. Relying on
a static representation  like the Herfindahl  index
Change  in Companies Surplus,
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F'igure 3.1
or the concentration  ratio does not really provide  Corresponding  Elements of Structure  --
information  about  the long run dynamic  conduct  Organizational and Market Form
of  the  industry  needed  to  assess  the
competitiveness and  contestabliity  of  the  Descrption of Organizational  Structures. When
market.  In addition, it should be noted that  describing  the  property-casualty  insurance
alternative  forms of insurance  (substitutes)  such  industry,  it  is  essential  to  understand  the
as  risk  retention  grous  (RRGs)  and  self  different  organizational structures  and  the
insurance  are  not  measured  in  either  the  expected  behavior  of  the  organizations
concentration  measures  or the long run entry  and  represented  in  the  U.S.  non-life  insurance
exit relationships. Thus, most reported figures  industry.  There  are  four  major  types  of
42insurance company organizations:  a)  stock  insurance company  today.43  Most  of  the
companies, b) mutual companies, c) reciprocal  existing  mutual  organizations  are
exchanges,  and d) Lloyd's organizations. Also,  well-established,  mature companies with large
companies may  be  organized as  e)  captive  relative market shares.  This form is also more
insurance companies, to include risk retention  common in the personal lines business than in
groups,  or  f)  public  insurance  entities.  commercial  lines of insurance.
Sometimes  there  is  overlap  between
organizational  structures, such as the case of a  Reciprocal exchanges are organizations
mutual  insurer  owning  a  stock  insurance  where  "subscribers" (policyholders) exchange
company  or  a  captive  insurance  company  insurance  guaranties  with each other through an
organized  through the issuance  of stock.  organized  exchange  managed  by  an
attorney-in-fact.  These  exchanges  are
Stock  companies  are corporations  with the  unincorporated, and  subscribers are  usually
financial ownership  of the company  represented  required to prepay a deposit  in order to establish
by shares of common stock. The owners of the  a surplus-equivalent  reserve to protect against
company have a  controlling financial interest,  large  fluctuations  in  the  exchange's  loss
but are not generally  purchasers (although  there  experience.  These  excess  funds,  usually
is no real reason why they cannot be customers  identified as surplus on the annual statement,
as well as owners).  These companies operate  represent "credits" to the subscribers' separate
much the same as any other corporation, with  insurance  accounts.  Depending  on  their
the owners receiving returns on their capital  operating  philosophy,  the  exchanges  may
investmei,ts in  the  form  of  dividends and  provide for assessing  policyholders  for reserve
appreciation in the value of the common stock.  shortfalls, may provide for  returning excess
Very few of these stock insurance companies  premiums, or they may do a  combination of
have actively  traded shares or a broad secondary  these  or  neither.  The  attorney-in-fact is
market; most stock companies  are closely held,  generally  compensated by  payment  of  a
either by  individuals or  by other  insurance  percentage of premium, but other methods may
companies  or insurance  holding companies.  be  used.  The liability of  the subscribers is
limited  to the value of premiums  paid.
A different  relationship  exists  with mutual
insurance companies, which are organized as  In contrast  to a stock or mutual insurance
corporations but with no capital stock.  The  company,  a  Lloyd's  organization  is  an
customers/policyholders  are the nominal owners  unincorporated  association  of  individuals
of the corporation, with an ownership interest  assuming  a specified  portion of the risk of each
represented by the amount of premiums and/or  policy  issued  by the organization. This structure
the number  of policies  they have purchased  from  is based on the famous international insurance
the company. While in theory  the policyholders  organization, Lloyd's  of  London (hence the
may install a new board of directors and replace  name "Lloyd's"  organization). The underwriters
management  if they are dissatisfied,  in practical  operate through an attorney-in-fact  and in some
terms  it  is  virtually impossible to  gather a  cases may participate in the operation of  the
sufficient block of policyholder/owner  votes to  insurer, or may simply put up funds with the
wrest control, and often the "owners"  of mutual  attorney-in-fact as a  deposit to  cover claims
insurance companies are relatively unaware of  costs. Liability  may be limited  to the deposit,  or
their rights.  Because of these difficulties, in  it  may  be  unlimited,  depending  on  the
larger  organizations  management  is  organization of  the association.  In  practice,
self-perpetuating  and subject to few controls  by  reinsurance  against  excess losses  often limits the
the owners. The mutual form of organization  is  obligation  of the underwriters, and often these
not a  common method for organizing a  new  organizations  cede 100  percent of their business
43to  an  affiliated  company.  This  form  of  applicants in  order  to  properly  price  the
organization  is rare in the United States.  applicant.
Because the management function in  a  In  the  United States, the  independent
stock  Insurer  is  separated  from  the  agency system is still a very strong force in the
ownership/risk-bearing function,  conflicts of  marketing  of insurance  products even  though the
interest may arise from the agency relationship  costs of operating  the system are higher than for
where  the  managers  may  be  motivated to  non-agencies  as described above.  The agent's
maximize their own utility at the expense of  compensation  is often tied to the premium level
shareholders and  customers [see Mayers and  of  the  product, so  there  is  an  incentive to
Smith  (1987)]. Management  controls  are usually  provide higher priced  products  in  order  to
installed  to minimize  this problem, but given  the  maximize agent wealth.  Independent agents
technical complexity  of the insurance industry's  represent any  number of  separate insurance
accounting  and profit measurement  systems,  this  companies, and  therefore are  better  able  to
may pose severe problems for owners.  This  provide price  information as  well as  quality
agency problem may be even more pronounced  information  to the customer.  The independent
in a mutual company. While the policyholders  agents  therefore  provide an information  service,
are the legitimate  owners of the company, true  which often results in higher average  prices paid
control is generally vested in management  of a  for  insurance products obtained through the
mutual company,  with the result that the agency  independent  agency system relative to the direct
problem  between  the  managers  and  the  marketing system or  the tied  (one company)
owners/policyholders  is more  pronounced. With  agency system.  Most  of  the  studies above
the  reciprocal  exchanges  and  the  Lloyd's  related  to a comparison  of costs between  agency
organizations,  day-to-day  operations  are  and non-agency  firms in personal lines.  When
controlled  by  the  attorney-in-fact.  The  these products are near-commodities,  an agency
agent/principal  problem as it pertains to owners  system  adds  little  value.  In  other  lines,
and managers does not apply, but  a  similar  however, where an agent adds some value, the
conflict arises between the policyholders and  use of an agency system may be justified based
management.  on increased  quality of service.
Agencies and Marketing Structure.  Another  Captive Insurance Companies.  The  agency
source  of  conflict is  between the  company  conflict  between  owners,  managers  and
management,  agents and/or policyholders. The  policyholders is  avoided through the  use  of
company  management  is assigned with the task  captive insurance  companies,  which in the U.S.
of maximizing  the wealth of shareholders  at the  may be organized  as stock or mutual companies,
expense  of  the  policyholders,  while  the  depending  on the law of the state of domicile.
policyholders  are attempting  to maximize their  The Captive  Insurance  Company  Directory  1991
value  from  the  insurance transaction.  The  [Tillinghast  (1991)] defines a captive insurance
policyholder often  has  a  higher  degree  of  company  as
knowledge of the individual risk of loss, but
often little knowledge  of the aggregate  class risk.  "A closely  held insurance  company
There are informational asymmetry problems,  whose  insurance  business  is
with  policyholders often  having to  rely  on  primarily  supplied  by  and
insurance agents for guidance in selecting the  controlled by  its owners, and in
best value coverage.  At the same time, the  which the original insureds are the
insurance company is relying on the agent to  principal  beneficiaries.
provide  a  first  line  screening of  insurance  [Tillinghast  (1991):  11
44The size of the captive  market is large  market  where  potential buyers  look  for
and growing.  The Captive  Insurance Company  undervalued firms.  Because the transactions
Directory 1991  lists  over  3,000 captive  costs  are extremely  high for outsiders  to obtain
organizations  world-wide,  with  the bulk  of these  information  regarding  some  insurance  firms, as
being single-parent  companies,  with over $10  they  are  not  publicly traded,  alternative
billion  in premiums  during  1990. Other  sources  mechanisms  for monitoring and  controlling
put the  size of  this  market much larger,  management  is required.
representing  30%  of the commercial  market  and
the  equivalent  of  $50 billion in  premiums  One reason firms may not be publicly
[Foppert  (1991)]. Factors contributing  to the  traded is because  of their underlying  purpose.
growth rate of  captive insurers include the  Mutual  companies  were formed to serve the
availability and  affordability of  primary  interests  of the  policyholders  and  not  necessarily
insurance  markets  in the U.S., the evolution  of  to  make the owners wealthy.  The mutual
the European  Common  Market,  tax issues  both  company  is  akin to  a  club and  its roots,
in  the  U.S.  and abroad, and relaxation  of  especially  in farm owners insurance  and life
regulatory  controls.  insurance,  are often found in social clubs or
regional  groups  of similarly  situated  consumers.
Risk  Retention Groups.  Risk  Retention  The mutual  firm is owed by the policyholders
Groups, which are  a  subset of the group  and  is  operated for  the  benefit  of  the
captive segment,  are  a  result  of  recent  policyholders  and not shareholders.  Thus,
relaxation  of U.S. regulatory  controls.  The  because  most mutual  policyholders  do not  view
original Risk Retention Act of  1981 was  themselves  as owners  and  because  the  firm  is  not
expanded significansty in  1986 to  allow  publicly  traded  there is a higher  likelihood  that wdexprean  d sficmantlyoin  1986hese  tor  zallow.  the management  is immune  from the market  for widespread  formaton of these  organizations,  takeovers. In addition,  policyholders  have  less
UJnder the  federal  Risk  Retention Act,  ability  and  inclination to  monitor  the
groups may be  formed to provide certain  management  as the costs  are relatively  high.
lines  of  commercial  insurance.  Risk
Retention Groups must obtain a license in  A second  discipline  on the management
one state and then may provide insurance  exists  from  the  market  for the pr'oduct  or service
coverage in all other states with a minimum  itself.  If the firms costs and prices are not
of regulatory  oversight. They have become  consistent  with the market,  policyholders  will
especially  attractive  in  the  Medical  defect  to the lower  priced  firm.  However,  if
Malpractice  line  of  insurance,  having  policyholders  do not shop  and search  for other
captured significant  market share during the  lower  priced  products,  then this discipline  has
1980s.  little effect  on the management  either.  Thus, high  search  costs  could  allow  the  management  to
behave  in a way that does not maximize  the
Some  Economics  of Organizational  Form  value  of the firm.
Because  of the principal-agent  problem,  Mayers  and  Smith  (1987)  have  promoted
owners  must find some manner  of organizing  a rather  innovative  theory  of organizational  form
their business  that assures  them of at least a  suggesting  certain forms have a comparative
competitive  return on their investment. The  advantage  for lines of business with certain
classic  argument  states,  however,  that  as long  as  characteristics.  If  the  cost  of  controlling
the organization  is on the market,  the managers  management  in mutual  companies  is higher  than
will manage competently  or  lose their jobs.  in stock  firms  (because  the value  of the firm is
This is because  there is a potential  take-over  not determined  in a competitive  market),  then
45mutuals  should  be more prevalent  in lines of  situations  both forms have similar financing
insurance where management  exercises  little  decisions  and  neither  form  should  perform  better
discretion  in setting  rates.  For example,  if a  than  the other.
line has a "good"  actuarial  table and a stable
legal  environment,  then  the management  merely  C.  Conduct
sets rates based  on the table and pays claims
when  they come  due. If discretion  is required,  Pricing. In the traditional  sense,  conduct  refers
then a stock  form may  be preferred  as one can  to the behavior  of the industry  in response  to
view the  results of  the  manager's use of  prices  and  the ability  to collude  to set  prices. In
discretion  as it affects  the value  of the firm in  the insurance  industry,  it is rather difficult  to
the market.  Furthermore,  the more  concentrated  believe that the industry  is one large cartel,
geographically  the firm's  operation  is, the easier  given the low concentration  levels described
it is to observe  the firm's  performance.  Even  for  above. However,  there is a suspicion  that the
mutual  company  participants,  policyholders  can  firms  collude  to set prices,  exclude  competition,
attend annual meetings  and can communicate  or reduce availability. This is the basis for
with  other policyholders  about management  recent  regulatory changes in  many  states performance  at lower  costs.  lessening  the ability of firms to collude.  In
addition,  these concerns  underlie  the attorneys Mayers  and Smith  found that stocks  are  general  suit against  the industry.
less geographically  concentrated  than mutuals,
but that mutuals  and stocks  appear about  the  Stigler's  (1968)  theory  of oligopoly  is  the
same in terms  of the lines  of business  in which  classic statement  on the subject.  Oligopoly
they  operate. This,  of course  may  be resulting  requires  a small  number  of firms  in the industry,
from the lack of relevance  of the discretion  an inelastic  market  demand,  a relatively  large
hypothesis  or more  likely  that, even  though  the  market  share  for the oligopolists,  easy  detection
market for takeovers  does not discipline  the  of cheating,  no ability  to compete  based  on non-
managers,  the external  product  market  is a good  price  terms  and a homogeneous  product.
discipline  on the firms  and organizational  form
does  not matter.  The  insurance industry, even  when
From a  corporate finance perspective  allowed  to collude  legally,  does not meet  these
Datta and Doherty  (1989)  show  that the form  criteria. Danzon  (1983)  provides  evidence  that 3attay  and  iffelevanty  (1  )  bthow  tt  t fi  rmae  even  when  collusion  was  legal,  collusion  was  not may be irrelevant  as both types  of firms  make  used to prohibit  entry  and make above-normal
basically  the  same  decisions.  Mutuals,  according  profits. Rating  bureaus,  such  as the Insurance
to the standard  theory,  are more  likely  to exist  Services  Office  (ISO),  provided  "services"  rather
when the costs of expanding  and contracting  than  collusion. The reason  is simple: Even  in
assets  and when  the costs  of obtaining  accurate  nror  approyal  states  where  it was  easy  to detect
information  about  the value  of the firm  are low.  pro  approa  ttsweeia  eaytodec informatt  ioand  abohrty  mdevalu  the firm"s  oratg  lrate  changes  (i.e., cheating),  there  are no strong Datta and Doherty  model  the firm's operating  entry barriers.  Even though ISO rates were
and  financing  decisions  together,  as  the decision  more likely to be observed  in prior approval
to sell additional  policies  is akin to increasing  states, large firms  were the ones that deviated.
debt.  Because  the non-life  insurance  industry  This  is consistent  with  the view that  small  firms
has a mix  of mutual  and  stocks,  one  would  think  Turchased  the ratin  information  because  the
that one form would eventually  evolve to  purchase  the  yrting  tormation  ratey
dominate  the market. Datta and Doherty  sho%.  did not  have  the expertise  to set  their  own  rates.
that  the reason  both  forms  exist  is that  when  the  Recently, there has been tremendous
operating  and financing  decisions  of the mutual  concem  about auto rates that has manifested
are considered  together,  under  certain  reasonable
46itself  in  politically controlled prices.  The  contract (with proper reserving) is the preferred
thought was  that  insurers were  using  their  product. Information  about  this product-quality
market power to earn supra-wrmal profis.  In  dimension  is not necessarily  available, so firms
many areas of the country, auto insurance rates  have an incentive  to price below coss  to gain
doubled in the 1980s. Two reasons explain the  market share.
rise.  lhe first is general inflation. Tbe CPI has
increased  approximately 50%  since  1980.  This so-called 'cash-flow" underwriting
Secondly, the price increases are related to real  works in the short run because searching and
cost  increases  in  the  industry  (Harrington,  switching  to another  insurer imposes  transactions
1988).  costs  on  the  consumer.  In  the  long  run,
profitability  suffers and potential insolvency  can
Pricing conduct in the non-life  area has a  occur for some firms.
nun,ber of dimensions:  cash flow undenrwiting;
naprice  competition;  cyclicality;  and collusion.  Tbis problem  has led, in the past, to calls
In  a  perfectly competitive market, all  prices  for price regulation of  the non-life insunce
would be  identical for  all products within a  industry.  However, in a market where quaity
given  markeL.  The  assumptions underlying  is not observable,  price should be a good proxy
perfect competition  are that no individual  finn  for quality. For example,  suppose  an individual
has the ability  to set price.  Only the market can  searches and obtains five price quots  of $100
affect the price.  and a sixth price of $50 for identical insurance
contracts. The five firms could be colluding  to
One problem with the perfect compedtion  keep prices high (the low-rice  firm is not part
model is that it assumes perfect and cosdess  of the cartel).  Altenaively,  the five firms'
information  by all buyers and sellers.  In the  prices cod  take resrvng  into accou  whie
insurance  industry,  this  smption  is  not  the low-cost firm does not.  l  this case, the
necearily  true.  For example, insurers can not  low-cost  firm is of low quality as its probability
predict perfecty whelher a consumer  is a good  of payoff in the event of a claim is low.
or a bad risk.  In addition, the insurer cannot
necessarily  predict whether  an insured will have  Given the competitive  nature of the non-
big  laims or small  claims against the firm.  On  life  insurance industry,  one  can  argue that
average, the firm can make good estimates,  but  consumers 'pay  for what they geLt  That is,
errors do occur.  collusion  is realy nwt  possible, so a deviation  in
price reflects a deviation  in quality. A consumer
A second problem is that the insurance  who purchased  a low cost fire policy in the late
consumer can not readily teUl  if the in  srance  1800s,  especialy after the massive  bankrupties
company is a  good" company, i.e., it pays its  of the large city fims,  must have known that a
claims prmptly,  or is a 'bad'  company  in the  low  price  implied low quality.  lbus  it  is
sene  it  is  very  difficult  to  obtaim  questionable whether  fixing  prices  thrugh
reimbursements.  Also, the consumer can not  regulation  did no more than increase  the number
tel whether the company  is charging  a price  that  of firms and allow them all to  sell at prices
reflects  actuarial estimates of  the  necessary  above true long-un margin  costs.
reserves to  back the policy in  case of  loss.
When ficed  with  two  contracts identical in  French and Samprn  (1981) exmined
coverage, the consumer  will select the coverage  reg_ted  markets to  determine whether price
with  the  lower  price.  However,  if  the  competition or  non-price competition existed
probability of  paymet  in  case  of  loss  is  relative to  competitive makets.  Non-pce
substally  less  than  one  for  a  particular  compettion  arguably  occurs  in  regulated
contract,  it  is  possible that  a  higher-priced  enronmens  where  price  movemen  are
47restricted.  Thus, firms have an  incentive to  Underwriting  Cycles.  The traditional reason
compete along other dimensions. The test for  given for  the  existence of  property-liability
whether the benefits of non-price competition  cycles  supposes  an  equilibrium  position
outweigh its costs is to determine the product  disturbed  by some exogenous  shock. This shock
costs in a regulated  state and compare  them with  causes an  increase in profits, which in turn,
a  product  in  a  competitive state,  holding  increases  the firm's capacity to write insurance.
everything else constant.  In a test of auto and  An increase in ca4acity  then increases  the firn's
liability insurance, French and Samprone  found  desire to sell more insurance allowing the firm
that regulation  (and ihus non-price competition)  to lower prices in order to employ its capacity.
had no effect on the aggregate  demand for auto  This  price  cutting  behavior  then  causes  a
insurance. Thus, regulation  of prices  to prevent  decrease in profitability  that, in turn, results in
cash flow underwriting  did not affect demand.  a  decreasing surplus.  The  firm then starts
pricing  its  product in  a  manner supposedly
If consumers  truly desired  protection  from  reflecting its true costs, eventually leading to
unscrupulous  firms  that  failed  to  reserve  higher  prices and an increase in surplus [Stewart
properly and consumers  were not able to discern  (1987)1.  This  reasoning does  not  suggest
the difference between a  "good" firm and a  anything about the shocks that start the cycle,
"bad"  firm,  then  regulation  should  have  nor the pre-shock equilibrium.
increased  the  demand  for  insurance.  For
liability lines, French and Samprone had some  Industry folklore states the reason cycles
relatively impressive evidence that consumers  exist is because there is no market restraint.
place a value of only $.14 on each additional  The proponents  of the "lack of restraint" theory
$1.00  spent  on  service  or  other  quality  believe  the cycle is caused by the lack of ability
dimensions. It seems that regulation  to prevent  to control  price.  When everyone else is cutting
price competition does not serve the public's  price to  lure  new customers, the proponents
interest.  believe that the  industry should refrain from
lowering  price [Stewart (1987)].
This cash flow underwriting  probleir.  has
also been called destructive competition. Few  There is some economic  intuition  behind
economists  subscribe to the belief that there are  this "lack  of restraint" theory. Cycles  could  also
welfare losses due to  competition.  While the  exist as a result of a Cournot two period game.
industry may not like the situation, if there is  In this game firms make a choice of capacity  in
continual entry,  availability of  products  (at  the first period and then compete  on price in the
prices consumers are willing to pay), and long-  second. If capacity choice is greater relative to
run industry normal profits, from an economic  the market demand, then prices fall.  Similarly,
perspective  no problem exists.  if capacity is chosen too low, then prices will
rise in the second period  The problem here is
The long-run profitability  seems to be an  that  the  game  generates  relatively  random
issae in two dimensions  of the conduct-structure-  behavior and not cyclical behavior.
performance  paradigm. First, it manifests  itself
in the underwriting  cycle and second in the long-  Rotemberg  and Soloner  (1986), however,
run  performance  of  the  industry.  The  pres-.,  a very interesting theory of oligopoly
underwriting  cycle implies different prices over  behavior  that could cause cycles.  Using a tacit
time and will be  discussed here.  However,  collusion model,  they introduce a  stochastic
because different prices may imply different or  market demand.  At each period the players
changing  profitability, they will be discussed  in  learn  the current  state of  demand and  then
the performance  section, too.  simultaneously choose their  prices.  If  the
demand is high, the incentive to undercut the
48'tacit collusion  price" is high.  If, in addition,  future, there should be no cycles [Cummins  and
the penalty for price cutting (lost future profits)  Outreville  (1987)].
is  small,  then  firms  will  abandon  their
monopolistic  pricing, thus engaging in a price  McGee  (1986),  in  contrast  to  other
war.  This  description of  behavior sounds  researchers, allows for the possibility  that firms
suspiciously  like  the  industry's  "lack  of  have different expectations  about the future. He
restraint" complaint.  suggested cycles exist because insurance firms
may  differ  as  to  their  future  expectations
Other theories  of cycle  behavior  generally  concerning losses.  For  example, companies
are  industry  specific.  Berger  (1988),  for  with optimistic conjectures  about future claims
example, presents an economic  model that also  may write policies with premiums below the
explains  the cyclicality  observed  in the insurance  average expectation  of the future losses. Thus,
markets.  Berger's result is based on a simple  companies may still be profit maximizing by
model of firm behavior based on the fact that  allowing  prices to fall below the expected  future
profits feed into surplus with a lag.  The firm  loss since  they desire  sales volume  to cover  their
sets its underwriting  policy for the coming  year  fixed costs.
based upon its current surplus that then leads to
offsetting  shifts in supply.  Harrington (1984) took a more complete
approach to the thinking about the causes of
Venezian  (1986)  suggests  a further  reason  cycles.  He believed that the market cyclicality
why  one  might observe  cyclical patterns in  may be caused by more than one of the above
profits.  The fault, according to Venezian, is  factors  and  perhaps  others.  Differing
that  regulatory  and  accounting systems are  expectations about  future  losses,  lags  in
imperfect  and these imperfections  allow  errors to  adjustment, excessive  risk taking, and random,
creep into the firm's decision making process.  but large, forecast errors may have contributed
Specifically,  Venezian  claimed  that the naive use  to market volatility. The problem with this area
of past lost experience to predict future losses  of research is that there was little evidence  about
can cause cycles. This is plausible on its face,  the magnitude of the cycle, its length or  the
but  one  would  expect  that  firms  would  cycle's sensitivity  to any of tne possible causes.
eventually learn  that  it  is  their  forecasting
naivete  that is leading  to volatility  in the market;  Recently,  researchers have  started  to
thus providing  them with an incentive  to develop  collect  empirical evidence about the  cycle.
better methods.  However, if firms used bureau  Venezian  (1986)  did find that the cycle followed
rates, as they did in the past, then this incentive  an AR(2)  process and that it had a periodicity  of
is minimized.  about 6 years.  Cummins  and Outreville (1987)
using Venezian's approach found there were
The fact that cycles exist, in theory or in  empirically  observable  cycles in many  countries.
fact, is disturbing  given some belief in efficient  They hypothesized  that the differences in cycle
and competitive  markets. Most would  agree that  length may be attributable to  institutional and
in  the U.S.  insurance industry the market is  regulatory  arrangements  in each of the countries.
competitive, yet the U.S.  has a  very cyclical  In an  interesting follow-up, Outreville (1989)
underwriting pattern.  In perfectly competitive  examined  a cross section  of the U.S. market to
markets there  should be  no  cycles, because  examine  if  certain  state  regulations  were
everyone has perfect information  about all the  associated with the presence or  duration of a
relevant variables and everyone  is able to make  cycle. If cycles are caused or coincide with a
an unbiased forecast of the future.  In fact,  state or country's set of  insurance regulatory
under a rational expectations  framework where  policies, and if the cycles can be mitigated by
the firm can make its best guesses about the  removing  these regulations, then the regulations
49should be removed.  In his study, Outreville  the general business cycle and the combined
examined the U.S.  auto liability market and  ratio were tied together over time.  They found
found that there was a significant relationship  that real GNP and short term interest rates were
between  the  existence  of  an  empirically  both related to the combined ratio and that a
observable cycle and regulation. For example,  shock to  real GNP had a large effect on the
there was a relationship  between  thie  type of rate  cyclical behavior of  the combined ratio but,
regulation  in a state and the existence  of a cycle.  although  significant,  the effect of a shock to the
In those states with prior approval laws there  short term interest rate was very small.
was a higher likelihood  a cycle would exist.
Collusion and the Liability Crisis.  The latest
Outreville  claimed  that the prior approval  liability crisis, occurring in the mid 1980s  at the
laws were "mainly responsible' for the cycle  peak of the r-derwriting cycle, has been subject
existence. This may be a strong statement and  to  tremendous scrutiny.  George Priest,  the
may  be  misleading as  many other  possible  preeminent researcher in this area, has a very
causes could exist for  empirically observable  detailed theory about the causes of the liability
cycles. Non-competitive  rating laws may be the  crisis that relates to the change in the tort system
symptom  rather than the cause as other social or  assignment of  liability  from  a  negligence
political attributes  could be the true cause (or at  standard to  a  strict liability standard [Priest
least a partial contributing  factor) for the cycles.  (1987)]44
Cummins and Outreville also suggested  Under the traditional legal and economic
that institutional  and regulatory  differences  may  analysis  of liability  rules [see Landes and Posner
be the cause of the underwriting cycle.  Grace  (1987)],  the  negligence rule  and  the  strict
(1990)  examined  this hypothesis  across countries  liability rule are both efficient liability rules.
and found that regulatory  differences  do matter.  Imposing a  negligence standard requires the
Countries  with  more  restrictive  regulatory  manufacturer to  eliminate all  risks  that  are
policies  tended to  have  cycles  and  greater  efficiently  eliminated  through  due  care.
volatility.  Tennyson (1990), in a study of the  Efficient elimination of risks requires that the
U.S.  market  obtained  similar  conclusions.  manufacturer  behave reasonably, or reduce the
Finally, Winter (1991)  theorizes  that the cycle is  expected  costs from a lawsuit  below the costs of
a result of another form of regulation,  solvency  changing  the product.
regulation,  by the state.  His model showed  that
when a premiums to insurer surplus constraint,  In the last fifty or so years, the U.S. tort
like  that  used  by  insurance  regulators  is  system has moved manufacturers  away from a
employed, a cycle results.  negligence  rule towards a rule of strict liability.
Two goals are generally used to  support this
It is interesting  to note, however, that the  move.  The first  is  that  strict  liability can
presumed  basis of the cycle's existence  is rooted  prevent  future  preventable  accidents  as
solely  within  the  industrial  and  regulatory  manufacturers  increase the amount of care they
institutions  of the insurance industry.  Intuition  undertake  to produce  their products. The second
would dictate that this is not necessarily  the case  goal is  to  allocate the risk  of unpreventable
as general economic  conditions  should affect the  accidents. The switch from negligence  towards
decisions  of  all  industries,  including  the  strict liability, according the Priest (1988), has
insurance industry.  Thus,  it is important to  not reduced injuries caused by manufacturer's
determine whether the swings in  the general  goods.'  Thus,  the  first  goal  is  not  met.
business cycle are associated  with the insurance  Secondly, Priest  claims that use  of  the tort
cycle.  Grace  and  Hotchkiss  (1992) used  system to  allocate the  costs of  unavoidable
econometric  cointegration  techniques  to fmd that  accidents  is extremely inefficient.
50One of the goals of product liability is to  even given the  opportunity to  offer  a  more
increase the safety of products.  Priest (1988)  restrictive  contract. ThIus,  even with the liability
analyzed the growth of product liability cases  crisis and the pressures brought about by poor
and  compared this  growth to  accident rates.  underwriting  performance, the industry did not
Priest found no reduction in accident  rates, but  successfully  collude to restrict contract terms.
dramatic increases in tort damage awards over  This supports the contention  that the market is
time.  He  argued his  finding is  due to  the  relatively competitive.
insensitivity  of product liability law to the cause
of accidents. Both manufacturers  and consumers  D.  Market Performance
have  a  role  in  accident  reduction.
Manufacturers must design and produce safe  The size and persistence  of profits in the
products.  The consumer must use them in a  non-life insurance  industry have been discussed
reasonable  manner.  However, the law may not  for over twenty years.  In the late 1960s,  there
examine  the consumer's use of the product and  was  the concern  that, relative  to other industries,
courts cannot guarantee that consumers use the  profits in non-life insurance  were too low.  Due
product carefully.  As a result of awards (even  to the heightened  scrutiny  insurers  received  from
erroneous awards), manufacturers may design  the liability crisis and the automobile  insurance
and  manufacture safer products.  The safer  pricing crisis, profits were again the subject of
products may give consumers a false sense of  definitional debate:  using one standard, the
security about the product.  Consumers  reduce  industry earns below-normal  profits, but using
the level of care they use causing  an increase in  another  standard  it  earns  above-normal
the accident  rate.'  profits. 4
Allegedly  as a result of pressures  brought  The  Insurance  Services  Organization
to bear on the insurers, the industry leaders and  (ISO) does not think unrealized capital gains
industry  related organizations  met to alter one of  should  be included  in the profit definition. The
the more troublesome  contracts.  The Insurance  National  Insurance  Consumer  Organization
Services  Organization  provides  standard  contract  (NICO), however, claims that the industry is
forms as  well as  rating services to  member  overly  concerned  with  operating  income
firms.  One of these contracts was for general  measures and should consider capital gains and
pollution liability.  Certain firms desired the  expenses  that  would  be  deducted  under
contract  terms to be changed so as to limit the  Generally  Accepted  Accounting  Principles
time period of the obligation  to insure, to limit  (GAAP).  In  addition, the  industry fails to
the insurance companies'  liability for accidental  discount  future  losses  and  inappropriately
pollution, and to limit the contractual  liability to  deducts policyholder  dividends [See Harrington
cover legal fees in the event of suit.  (1988)].
The attorneys general of  twenty states  The industry uses Statutory Accounting
entered a joint  lawsuit against the  ISO  and  Procedures (SAP) to  determine profitability.
certain firms alleging that the firms engaged in  SAP is designed  for the purpose of determining
practices in violation  of the antitrust laws. 47 It  the  solvency  of  a  company  rather  than
is interesting  to note that (1) the industry used  determining its  market value.' 9 Determining
its allegedly  tremendous  powers to collude (due  market value is the goal of GAAP accounting
t4, a federal anti-trust exemption), and (2) that  although GAAP accounting does not discount
the  industry's attempt to  change the contract  losses  to market values either.  However, in the
form was not successful. The ISO had to offer  last few years, the magnitude  of this difference
both contracts as many of  its  member firms  between SAP-determined  value and GAAP-
desired to provide the more expensive  coverage
51Profitability  over  Time
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F:igure  3.2  Non-Life Industry Profitability,  1970-1989
determined  value has not been significant.  life industry without capital gains, and 10.30%
for the industry including  capital gains.
Figure 3.2 shows  the industry  profitability
over time and compares the non-life insurance  In addition, the standard  deviation  of the
industry profit  measures (with  and  without  S&P financials  was 2.9 while it was 4.5 and 9.0
unrealized capital gains) with the Standard and  for the non-life  industry without  and with capital
Poors financials.  As shown in the figure, for  gains,  respectively.  Thus,  relative to  other
some  years  the  non-life  insurance  industry  financials, the insurance industry seems to be
performs better than the S&P financials  while in  slightly less profitable  and slightly more risky.
other years the reverse is true.  Over this time
period, the mean return on net worth has been  Because of  the  problem of  comparing
11.85%  for S&P financials,  10.55% for the non-  different  industries  one  may  argue  that
traditional accounting profit measures are not
52Table 3.6  Internal Rates of Return and CAPM  Rates  for various  Lines, 1980-1989.
Conum  Comm  Pnivate
Other  Home  Multi-  Auto  Pass  Workers'
Year  Liability  Owners  Peril  Llability  Auto  Comp  CAPM
Liability
1980  0.233  0.108  0.230  0.189  0.291  0.236  0.094
1981  0.252  0.206  0.190  0.191  0.302  0.278  0.132
1982  0.198  0.162  0.133  0.139  0.265  0.256  -0.032
1983  0.134  0.127  0.045  0.070  0.195  0.157  0.101
1984  0.122  0.092  0.007  0.046  0.187  0.130  0.118
1985  0.107  -0.004  0.042  0.073  0.136  0.117  0.459
1986  0.134  0.082  0.207  0.108  0.103  0.078  -0.046
1987  0.141  0.251  0.388  0.132  0.101  0.135  -0.154
1988  0.144  0.156  0.268  0.125  0.095  0.133  0.029
1989  0.143  -0.071  0.103  0.097  0.084  0.131  NA
mean  0.161  0.111  0.159  0.177  0.0176  0.165  0.106
std  0.046  0.090  0.113  0.046  0.081  0.064  0.170'
dev.
'Mean and standard  deviation  taken from series for 1976-1988.
Source: Cummin and Weiss (1991), Tables  5 and 6.
helpful. Cummins  and Weiss (1991)  suggest  the  reserves to surplus ratio in each year.  Their
use of the internal rate of return  MRR).  The  results are shown in Table 3.6.  Cummins and
IRR is the rate of return that sets the discounted  Weiss find high rates of return in the early part
cashflows from a project equal to zero.  It is  of  the  decade  which they  attribute to  high
then compared  to the target rate of return (or the  interest rates and favorable  underwriting  results.
cost of capital) to determine whether the return  In addition, they find that the IRRs fall during
on the project is acceptable. A major problem  the so-called  crisis years, 1984  and 1985. After
with the IRR is that the NAIC does not require  the crisis years, general liability  and commercial
disclosure of the timing of premium flows for  multi-peril return to more normal levels while
the various lines of insurance. In addition, there  returns to  workers' compensation  remain low
is an allocation  problem due to the fact that the  and private automobile  liability returns decline.
firm is generally a multiline company  and there  These last two lines have been subject  to intense
is no non-arbitrary  method to allocate  the firm's  regulatory scrutiny and this may explain their
equity to each line.  relatively poor performance.  In contrast, less
regulated  lines such as general liability returned
Cummins  and Weiss calculated  industry-  to more normal levels quickly after the crisis.
wide IRRs for six major lines for the period
1980-1990. They allocated surplus by line on  Cummins  and Weiss then ask whether  the
the basis of  reserves using the industry-wide  IRR is a reasonable  approach to examining  cost
53of capital  issues. They then derived  a capital  E.  Conclusions
asset pricing model cost of capital which is
reported in the last column  in the table.  The  The  U.S.  non-life insurance industry
IRRs  for personal  auto,  workers'  compensation,  exhibits  low  concentration  whether  one  examines
and general liability  are close to the CAPM  thenationalmarketorstatemarkets.  Evenwhen
results  in the first three  years  of the  decade,  but  enatinal  market  or  a marets.  Eve when
are below the CAPM results for the years 1983-  -examion  aliy  rlne  basis,
1986. Again,  general  liability  returns  increase  concentration  is low, especially  related  to the
to  the CAP  leel  while pesoa  auo  .n  average  four firmn  ratio of the industrial  sectors
workers'  compensation  ren  do  n  of the economy. In addition,  even with the workrs'compnsaion  etuns  d  no.-  limited ability to  collude to  set  prices  and
Cummins  and  Weiss  find  that  commercial  multi-  limteabty  to coludto  setfpis  and
..  >  ......  . . ~~~contract  terms,  the  industry seems to  be
peril follows a pattern to general liability, while  competitive and earns profits below similarly
commercial  auto  and  home  owners  tend  to have  situated  financial  firms. Finally,  although
lower returns.  In general, unregulated  lines  subject  to  some definitional  debate,  insurer
seem  to be earming  adequate  returns,  while  those  profitability  is not consistenty  above  or below
lines subject  to stricter  regulation  are arguably  normal  returns.  However,  using  the IRR  as an
earning  below  adequate  levels.  indication  of  profitability  it seems that the
strictly regulated  lines such as auto insurance
and workers' compensation  may earn below
adequate  levels  for long  term viability.
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60Notes
1.  Texas only repealed its very unpopular  75% local investments  requirement  in 1967 [Orren (1974)].  There
might be grounds for such discriminatory  investment  restrictions  on the basis of an infant industry argument.
Protection may be justified until the industry  is capable of competing  with other firms.  The problem is that
protection  may lead to higher costs and inefficiencies. A higher cost industry will never be able to compete
with foreign  low cost firms and thus, protection  will be extended  to the high cost and inefficient  industry.
2.  75 U.S. (8. Wall) 168  (1868).
3.  U.S. Constitution,  Article 1, § 8.
4.  15 U.S.C. § 1-2 (1988).
5.  15 U.S.C. § 1011-15  (1988).
6.  For an excellent  discussion  of the liability  crisis, see Priest (1987). The crisis is discussed further in Chapter
MI.
7.  This change provoked the attorneys general of 30 states to sue major insurers for collusion to boycott
certain types of coverage. See section H below.
8.  Proposition 103  as codified  in California  Insurance  Code § 1861.01(a).
9.  National Underwiter - Propeny/Casualty  Edition  (August 26, 1991): 1.
10.  In December of 1991, Congress passed a banking bill that keeps the strict division  between insurers and
federal  banks intact.  Congress  is  likely to revisit  this issue in the near future.
11.  Section 628.151(1), Florida Statutes  (1991).
12.  Several different  plans were forwarded  during the 1960s  in Congress,  including  S. 2236, which proposed
a national  guaranty fund system in 1970.
13.  Traditionally,  insolvent  companies  were concentrated  in the automobile  insurance  line, and especially  in the
high-risk  portion  of that market. Therefore, the inclusion  of uninsured  motorists  coverage  for at-fault  drivers
insured by insolvent  companies  transferred  the insolvency  cost to policyholders  of solvent companies.
14.  Those  states allowing  a premium  tax offset  are: Alabama,  Arizona,  Arkansas,  Delaware,  Kansas,  Louisiana,
Missouri,  Nebraska, Nevada, Oregon,  Tennessee,  Texas, Utah, Washington,  and Wisconsin. Additionally,
Florida and Indiana allow an offset  against  income tax, and New  Jersey allows  a policy surcharge  to cover
the cost.  Barrese (1991) shows how a combination  of state offsets and federal income taxes can lead to
actual tax liability (incidence)  being passed from states with insolvencies  to states without insolvencies.
15.  Best's Review-Property/Casualty  Edition  (March, 1990):  20.
16.  These figures  do not include  the New York  State  Insurance  Guaranty  Fund, which  operates on a pre-funded
basis.
17.  'Mission  Estate  Pays  $107  million to  State  Insuance  Guaranty Funds,"  National  Underwriter-
Property/Casualty  Edition (July 1, 1991):  33.
6118.  The implementation  of guaranty funds in all states in the early 1970s was a  direct response to federal
initiatives  to establish  a national guaranty  system.
19.  National Underwriter  (December  24, 1990): 8.
20.  'A Survey of American  Insurance," The  Economist  (October  27, 1990).
21.  The combined ratio is the sum of the loss ratio and the expense ratio.  Note that is does not include
investment  income. Thus, a firm with a combined  ratio over 100% may be earning normal profits when
investment  income  is included  in the profit calculation.
22.  These factors  are discussed  in Chapter  111.
23.  For studies involving  the effect of tort reform on medical  malpractice  premiums see, Danzon (1986) and
Bovbjerg  (1989).
24.  First party insurance  refers to the situation  where the insurance  purchaser is protected for his own loss, as
opposed  to third  party insurance,  which  covers  damages  to another  person for which  the insurance  purchaser
is responsible.
25.  The payout  profile, or payout  pattern, is the annual  percentage  of incurred  losses  paid in each of the current
and future development  years.  A reserve is set up for those losses  which have occurred  during a coverage
period, but which  remain unpaid  for various reasons. These delays in claims  payments  may be substantial,
often several years or even decades.
26.  While there is a technical  difference  between  surplus  and excess  insurance,  this line is generally  blurred and
no material distinction  is made between  the two.
27.  Private Passenger  Auto  Liability  and Medical  Payments,  Commercial  Auto Liability  and Medical  Payments,
Homeowner/Fartnowner  Multi-Peril, Commercial Multi-Peril, Workers Compensation, Other Liability
(General Liability), Special Liability (Aircraft, Boiler &  Machinery, Ocean Marine), and  Medical
Malpractice.
28.  Some states specifically  exclude insurance  coverage  for punitive  damages  as being against  public policy.
29.  As a general rule, this coverage applies to losses which are excluded under the Fire and Allied Lines
property damage  insurance  and is limited to losses caused  by boiler/machinery  problems.
30.  One of the criteria for insurability  is independence  of loss exposures. For instance, automobile  accidents
are generally  independent  of one another. In the case of an earthquake,  damage  would be widespread  and
simultaneous,  thus swamping  the insurance  industry's ability to respond.  However, limited  coverage  with
readily available catastrophe coverage under reinsurance treaties do make this coverage commercially
insurable.
31.  The Herfindahl  index for a market is calculated  as
F I2
H=  S,  .
62. Herfindahl  index ranges from 0 to 1 where 0 is no concentration  and 1 is monopoly. The Department
of Justice, when considering mergers of two firms in the sawe industry, has a presumption that market
power exists if two firms would  have a post merger Herfindahl  greater  than .18 and the change in the index
is greater  than .1.  It is evident from Table 3.3 that few  portions  of the non-life  industry  even approach the
0.18 level.
In addition, the Herfindahl  can be used as a method  of determining  the number  of equivalently  sized firms
that could survive in the market. This number is calculated  as N = 1/H.  Thus, if the H =  .5, then there
is 'room'  for two equivalently  sized firms in the market.  This also yields an indication  of concentration.
In the examples  above, the market shares  si was calulated using net premiums  written for each market.
32.  Authors' calculation. Raw data from NAIC, Annual Statwemnt  Compilation  Tapes, 1990.
33.  This is a consequence  of the fragmented  nature of the regulatory system  in the United States, where each
state regulates  al  insurers doing business in that state.  The sheer volume of insurers requires the state
insurance departments  to delegate  the intense scrutiny of foreign insurers to their respective  domiciliary
states. This is discussed  further in a later section of this paper.
34.  The actual state requirements  a.  available  form the Center for Risk Management  and Insurnce  Resrch,
College of Business  Administration,  Georgia State  University.
35.  The growth of Risk Retention  Groups may be partially  attributable  to this restriction. These organizations
must obtain  a license  in only a single  state, and then they are able to operate in aUl  other states without  going
through the lengthy  licensing  process. These organizations  are formed  under federal  laws which supersede
the state requirements.
36.  This section draws heavily on Gardner (1991) as weUl  as the one of the  author's  (Barth) own experience
when serving as the supervisor  of the state licensing  effort of an expanding  personal lines inswer during  the
late 1980's.
37.  There is a definitional  problem  with the insurance firm's output. Risk shifting is the good that is being
provided, but the traditional  measure of output (premiums  written) may not adequately  reflect all that is
being provided. For example,  there is a quality  component  to the output.  The consumer  may be wilUing
to pay for a solvent  firm which  pays claims  quickly. This quality  dimension  is not discemable  in the present
insurance  output measures.
38.  As an aside, in 1989 the largest quartile (largest  570) of firms in the U.S. non-life  industry ranged in size
from $US 55 milions to $US 14,999  milUons. The largest Canadian  firms  used in Suret's analysis  would,
if otherwise  identical  to U.S. firms, fall  in the lower end of the largest quartile. Thus, the larger U.S. firms
should also have little or no scale and scope economies.
39.  While the discussion  here is focused  on rating systems,  it is equally applicable  to changes in the language
or structure  of policy forms and/or endorsements.
40.  Insurer  may invest more heavily if they desire, but the investment  exceeding  the state's cap is excluded
from the statutory  balance sheet, which directly  reduces  sumrlus.
41.  Ballen (1991).
42.  Because  the amount  of surplus  is politically  sensitive  information,  them is an alleged  tendency  to revi0s the
reported figure downward in good times to prevent an appearance  of ering  supra-normal  profits and to
revise it upward in bad times to avoid an appearance  of a solvency  problem.
6343.  A number  of physician  mutuals  were established  during the medical  malpractice  availability  crisis during  the
1970's.  Today, the Risk Retention  Group form would probably be preferred over a mutual insurance
company for similar availability  problems.
44.  For a very good summary and a critique of Priest's  views see Croley  and Hanson (1991).
45.  See in general Litan (1992).
46.  In addition, the use of the tort system  as a compensation  scheme  is extremely  costly.  According  to Litan,
Swive, and Winston  (1988), less than  one half of the total spent on tort litigation  goes to plaintiffs  as damage
awards.
47.  See Chapter II for more on the background  of this suit or see Priest (1989).
48.  This section comes from Harrington (1988).
49.  Note that the industry  uses SAP because  of government  regulation  and not out of an altruistic  desire to use
the accounting  standard for solvency assurance.
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